Terence Prittie *on Stalemate in Germany*

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T.R.B. *from Washington*

Truman Bucked Congress

★ We went up to the Hill recently asking some liberal friends in Congress what they thought about Kennedy. Kennedy's appointment of Arthur Goldberg to the high court is universally praised though some express regret that Goldberg can't be in two places at once. Kennedy will miss him in the Cabinet, everybody felt.

But there was considerable irritation toward Kennedy from a lot of liberals, we found, an attitude that seems to have been accumulating. They are chary about expressing it because they don't want to please the conservatives. But it is there all right. Maybe it is partly reaction to a situation Kennedy didn't make. It is pretty trying to be a liberal in the 87th Congress watching things run by committee chairmen not answerable to the national electorate while the White House begs favors! Here is a body that has rejected the school bill, medicare, omnibus farm bill, department of urban affairs; that is mauling the tax bill and foreign aid bill and that has not yet been educated up to the elementary theory of compensatory economics – a commonplace of virtually every other big country!

In a situation like this liberals have a profound instinctive fellow-feeling for Kennedy; they want to support him and back his bills. Their frustration comes from the fact, I think, that they feel Kennedy tries too hard to placate businessmen and conservatives; that he yields too much ground and doesn't display their own emotional commitment to the bills he espouses. Liberals are too much taken for granted, they say; to get "Thank you" from a White House liaison man one told me you have to be a Southern conservative.

It is queer how Truman's name keeps popping up in liberals' talk: Truman bucked Congress – said what he thought. People patronized Truman while he was President but now along come 75 eminent historians and in a poll on the rank of American Presidents they place Harry Truman way up in the "near great" class, behind Jackson and Teddy Roosevelt but ahead of John Adams and Cleveland. (Ike ranks low – average, a kind of C minus mark behind Andrew Johnson.)

What will historians say about Kennedy? He has done a good job, the liberal Congressman seem to think, on foreign aid, defense and trade; he forced Khrushchev to drop his November, 1961, deadline; he worked out of the Laos mess, and more recently he told his press conference that it is vastly better to have a less-than-perfect test ban agreement with Moscow than the alternative of a proliferation of A-bombs. That views shows enlightenment in the face of the Birchites.

Anti-Business!

★ But has Kennedy really fought for his liberal domestic proposals? His views are fine, Congressional liberals say, he seems to wilt when he is called "anti-business." Anti-business! – so what? Great Presidents have been called a lot worse things; maybe a President *should* be "anti-business."

Here are two typical gripes mentioned to me several times. Kefauver worked a good two years on his drug control bill, and then when Chairman Eastland and the ineffable GOP leader Dirksen gutted it in full committee the White House hardly lifted a finger. Along came the thalidomide horror and the Administration grabbed the issue and helped salvage the bill. But was the White House leading or following?

Again, on the economic side: Kennedy understands the Eisenhower primitivism that automatically equates federal deficits with inflation and a big budget with disaster. Yet prior to his Yale speech he talked about a balanced budget as though it were an end in itself, and he failed to distinguish between an administrative, a capital and all the other kinds of budget. Belatedly Kennedy set out to destroy "myths" at New Haven but not till after he had genuflected to them a few times.

There is something to be said, my liberal friends in Congress agree, for not getting the name of "radical," for pretending that Northern Democrats and Southern conservatives are all one happy party, and for trying to carry business along with you. But it fuzzes up issues and it produces apathy and confusion. The liberals I talk to genuinely seem to like Kennedy; they aren't going to desert him (and where could they go!), but I get the impression it is going to be harder to take them for granted from now on.

Ballooning Issue

★ After Labor Day the election campaign starts in earnest whether Congress is in session or not. Here's the tally: 35 governorships are up for grabs, (21 D; 14 R); 39 Senate seats (21 D; 18 R); the entire House – 435 members of whom the present 437 (yes, it shrinks two) are 262 D, 174 R, 1 vacancy. The election may decide who gets the GOP nomination in '64 depending on how Rockefeller in New York, Romney in Michigan, Nixon in California, and William W. Scranton in Pennsylvania (a remote dark horse) come out. There is also a kind of a referendum on Kennedy prestige and popularity, or at least all the correspondents will try to prove it, after the vote. Actually the "out" party has won back seats at mid-term every election this century except 1934, so the Democrats may lose 10 or 20 House seats on form.

The 1960 religious issue which made Kennedy lose 20 House seats in 1960 though he squeaked in, may have gone by now and this might neutralize the normal automatic Republican swing back. That's something to watch. If Kennedy loses 10 or 20 House seats it means stalemate for two more years.

Meanwhile a strange new factor is building up, that of kid brother Teddy Kennedy running in Massachusetts. Washington has talked about little else all week but the slashing personal attack upon 30-year-old Teddy by his Democratic rival, McCormack. President Kennedy has opened himself up for this one and it's the kind of personality clash that can balloon up into a national issue and delight the GOP.

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Although the forces of Chiang Kai-shek hold Quemoy and Matsu, they are in effect, by laws of geography, hostages held by Mao Tse-tung. The political and military reasons for defending Formosa do not apply to these two little islands just off the shore of Communist China. Instead, our commitment there gives Peking an ever-ready occasion to put on the pressure, to take it off, to bring us to the brink of war. . . . It is a dangerous mistake to leave such a temptation standing.
– JOHN F. KENNEDY, *The Strategy of Peace, 1960*

With the exception of a Berlin garrison surrounded by Communist territory on all sides, the most conspicuously exposed salient of United States military power is the Quemoy-Matsu island complex in the Formosa Straits. Six miles of water separate the 70,000 US-supplied Nationalist troops on these rocky outposts from the largest concentration of mainland Chinese Communist military force amassed since the Korean War.

The presence of the three jet fighter wings and two to four infantry divisions evident in the Amoy and Foochow coastal areas from June 20 until the present moment set off a brief war scare in the early summer, but has lately been attributed by the State Department to defensive fears inspired in Peking by stepped-up Nationalist invasion propaganda. In Washington, the official and political community prefers to have its scares one at a time and has turned principal attention to Berlin, the space race and the November election. Nevertheless, the President is said to feel discomfited by the contrast between what he has said about Quemoy and Matsu on numerous occasions as a candidate and what he has more recently judged to be practicable. The offshore islands problem reportedly figured in two unannounced White House sessions last week with Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs Averell Harriman. As a problem in foreign policy, Quemoy and Matsu pose no riddles: the interlude of quiescence in the Straits which has followed the President's June 26 expression of determination to defend the islands in the event of Communist attack is clearly propitious for staging a long overdue troop withdrawal. While the pressure is off the US has a fleeting opportunity to act from a posture of strength. But the offshore islands pose a certain political problem in the eyes of the President, for he remembers 1960, and is not in a mood to chance a campaign year showdown with Chiang.

It is little realized that the Communist buildup in mid-June came

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just as the Administration was initiating an intensive examination of the offshore islands issue in the course of a general reassessment of relations with the Chiang regime. The replacement of Ambassador Everett Drumwright in Taipei by Admiral Alan Kirk – an old friend of Secretary Harriman – was to be the occasion for a new US effort to persuade Chiang that the islands were more of a liability than an asset. There were logistics studies suggesting what would be required of the Seventh Fleet in transferring not only troops but up to 60,000 civilians from the island to Formosa. (It is said that the US and the Nationalists together have the naval capability to execute a withdrawal within 24 hours.) But in the face of Communist pressure all thought of withdrawal had to be abandoned. The question debated subsequently has been how much time must now be allowed to elapse before an honorable withdrawal might be accomplished.

In effect those who argue that the success of the President in deterring an attack has made possible a graceful early withdrawal have been arguing for a redefinition of US China policy. For it has grown more and more clear that only through the indirect route of a pullback from Quemoy and Matsu is the character of the US commitment to Chiang likely to be clarified in the foreseeable future.

If the Nationalists withdrew to Formosa (and the Pescadores) the way would be clear for the adoption by the West of a tacit "two-China" policy. A number of our allies who refuse to join in guaranteeing the security of the Chiang regime so long as it occupies the offshore islands might well be persuaded to support an independent regime in Taipei and some form of UN ratification of a *de facto* "two China" situation.

Actually, the reality during most of the Eisenhower Administration and all of the Kennedy Administration has been that the US is committed solely to the defense of Formosa and has had no intention of engaging in adventures on the mainland. By disentangling ourselves from the possibility of engagement on the offshore islands and drawing an unambiguous line in the Straits, the US would strengthen the political defenses of Formosa, which would continue to be dependent, militarily, on the US defense shield.

It is precisely because their withdrawal from the offshore islands would signal a "two-China" policy that the Nationalists cling to them. Quemoy and Matsu represent the only incontestably Chinese territory held by Chiang, for the status of Formosa has been unresolved since the removal of the island from Japanese control after World War II, and in recent years the Formosan autonomy movement has been gaining in stature. So long as Chiang holds Quemoy and Matsu the civil war is nominally on and the dream of a return to the mainland can be kept alive.

By the same token, Peking has nothing to gain from a peaceful withdrawal from the islands. Analyzing the 1958 offshore islands crisis in a *Yale Review* article two years ago, the respected authority Allen S. Whiting, who is now director of research on the Far East in the State Department, suggested that Mao may have indeed "gambled on linking Quemoy with Taiwan (Formosa) so as to frustrate any American move toward a 'two-China' policy. The 1955 'Formosan Revolution' permitted US defense of the island *only* if the President felt that their fall would jeopardize Taiwan. In August, 1958, Peking publicly proclaimed seizure of Quemoy as one step in the 'liberation of Taiwan.'. The reaction from Taipei and Washington seemed to include the islands in a joint Nationalist-American defense commitment. This made their abandonment practically impossible."

Such abandonment, Professor Whiting went on to observe, "would place 100 miles of ocean between the 'two-Chinas', thereby strengthening Taiwan's international position as a separate entity worthy of protection. If this was not Peking's concern, it was certainly affected by the crisis."

Whatever might account for the Communist buildup in June, the upshot of this most recent of three offshore islands crises in eight years is that a Communist attack has been deterred, that two months have now passed without an attack and that the opportunity is once again available for a confrontation with Chiang which has become patently inescapable.

It is said that the US cannot work its will with the Nationalists. Yet the record indicates that when Washington has shown determination, Taipei has had to give ground. For example, when the Communists launched their first assault on the offshore islands in 1955, the Nationalists were threatening to the end to attack the mainland, but nevertheless yielded to US pressure to regroup by withdrawing from the Tachens. In June, the US not only squelched renewed nationalist plans for landing on the mainland but went so far as to give public assurance to Peking in the Warsaw talks that the US would not aid a Nationalist landing. Chiang swallowed this without overt complaint and did nothing to upset the situation.

The dependence of the Nationalists on US aid is so complete that the bargaining positions of the two sides are ridiculously unequal. But in the past the US has been represented by Ambassadors whose personal sympathies have as often as not appeared to be on the side of the Nationalists. It is difficult to imagine that a regime which would long ago have been replaced in the UN were it not for the US can deter the President and Secretary Harriman indefinitely from their pursuit of the US interest. As for the domestic political hobgoblins, that is something of another order.

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Mr. Justice Goldberg

Not a dozen of the nearly 100 men who have been Justices of the Supreme Court have left a creative mark on our constitutional history. Among the moderns – excluding any still sitting – one counts Brandeis, Holmes, perhaps Hughes, perhaps Stone, possibly Cardozo, and certainly Mr. Justice Frankfurter. Such a retirement as his has its impact not merely on the balance of votes but on the entire judicial landscape. To use a more suggestive figure, it is the magnetic field within which the Justices operate that has been altered. The removal of a creative influence which has radiated powerfully for over 20 years necessarily implies a rearrangement of past patterns in what is a continuing process of action and reaction within the Court.

Some make the facile assumption that the contours of the new arrangement can be readily predicted. But if this will no doubt prove to be the case on many important issues (the new Justice would not have been likely to join the Frankfurter dissent in the *Baker* v *Carr* reapportionment decision), Mr. Goldberg's legal thought, as it might affect the issues likely to face the Court in the near future, has not been so clearly delineated as one might imagine. He shares the very broad consensus on the relative weight of property and individual rights which Justice Frankfurter – with Justices Black and Douglas among those still living – established in the decade following the upheaval of the Court-packing fight of 1937. But the issues currently before the Court arise within rather than about that consensus. Moreover, the history of the Court is replete with examples of a rather surprising intellectual sea change following appointment to the Court. Who would have expected that ex-prosecutor Earl Warren would make his notable about-face in criminal cases after several years on the bench and prove so consistently a partisan of defendants' rights? Or that Hugo Black, an Alabaman, would rub out all trace of his youthful political colors while Indiana New Dealer Sherman Minton was revealing himself as inhospitable to the claims of civil liberties?

It can be said in welcoming the appointment of the new Justice with the greatest satisfaction that he is a man of first-rate intellectual capacity, and that as an experienced practitioner before the Court he has a sophisticated understanding of its function and its ways. His contribution to the Kennedy Administration has been notable for his forthright disregard of old ties with organized labor in shaping a new doctrine of the national interest in labor-management disputes. Mr. Kennedy is said to have felt a sense of obligation to Mr. Goldberg for his early support of the Kennedy candidacy and for his willingness to burn his bridges in the cause of the Administration despite the fact that

Footnotes *to the* Week

"TEDDY" KENNEDY handled himself effectively in his first TV debate with Edward McCormack. The growing consensus in Massachusetts is that by looking past McCormack's barbed questions concerning his qualifications for office, and by ignoring attacks on nepotism, the President's 30-year-old brother managed to make himself appear the underdog. The response of the in-the-flesh audience at McCormack's old school, South Boston High, is said to have confirmed this estimate. —— SARGENT SHRIVER *is reportedly less than pleased with Teddy's candidacy, for the national furore over "dynasticism" now aroused has sharply hurt his hopes for replacing Fowler Hamilton as head of the Agency for International Development. Unhappy as the White House is with Hamilton, he is likely to stay on for some time.* —— ATTORNEY GENERAL Robert Kennedy has been unwilling to invoke the US neutrality laws (which forbid "launching a military expedition or enterprise" against a country with which we are not at war) against the 23 Cuban youths who shelled the Havana waterfront from a motor boat. The Justice Department states that the laws were not technically violated, but most lawyers agree that if the attack had been launched by dissident Canadians against Toronto or Quebec he would have taken action —— AYUB KHAN *of Pakistan has given an unconditional release to his most distinguished political prisoner, former Prime Minister H. S. Suhrawardy. The move in part signifies an effort to remove skeletons from his political closet before attending this month's meeting of Commonwealth Prime Ministers in London and lunching with President Kennedy at Newport September 14. But Ayub is also credited with increasing political sophistication as well as a new disposition to come to terms with some hitherto forcibly repressed dissident forces in Pakistan in the wake of adoption of the national Constitution and the consequent convening of a clamorous Parliament.* —— MUTUAL FUNDS have been roughed up in a study just published by the Securities and Exchange Commission. The report accepts what many investors have argued all along: individual purchasers of securities could have done as well for themselves, on the average, without paying the commissions and management fees collected by the funds. —— WILLARD WIRTZ is not the only old colleague of Adlai Stevenson who has been a recent beneficiary of Presidential favor. The elevation of Stevenson's widely-respected former law partner from Undersecretary to Secretary of Labor in place of Arthur Goldberg follows the choice of Carl McGowan – special counsel to Stevenson as Governor of Illinois – to a Federal Circuit Court of Appeals vacancy.

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on such major matters as the tax cut his pleas have been overruled. The President is also reported to have remarked that the designation of a Jewish appointee in this instance need not forever doom the chances of the also-ran who was passed over in favor of Mr. Goldberg – Harvard Law School Professor Paul Freund.

Johnson and Civil Rights

Since its creation over a year ago, the President's Committee on Equal Employment Opportunity, chaired by Vice President Lyndon Johnson, has been racked by internal dissension. The basic question at issue has been the extent to which the agency would use its substantial enforcement powers to assure fair employment of Negroes and other minorities by government contractors. On one side, a go-slow faction has sought to give priority to the purely voluntary "plans for progress" program of Committee member Robert L. Troutman, Jr., an Atlanta segregationist who numbers both President Kennedy and Georgia Senators Russell and Talmadge among his political friends. The free-wheeling Troutman effort has directly interfered in a number of cases with the regular staff enforcement operation supervised by Executive Director John G. Feild, an able and experienced professional in fair employment activities; and it has seemed increasingly likely that a showdown would develop over the challenge to the staff and its activist supporters on the Committee.

Although the Vice President has sought to play a moderating role, for Troutman is not a "Johnson man," there have been fears that he might feel obliged to placate old Congressional allies such as Russell by toning down the enforcement operation. In recent weeks activists on the Committee and civil rights leaders have been alarmed by reports that top direction of the staff enforcement operation was to be removed from Executive Director Feild and entrusted to a Johnson political lieutenant in a newly-broadened post of Executive Vice-Chairman. This rumor gained substance last week when Johnson released a report prepared at his request by Theodore Kheel, a New York lawyer and past president of the National Urban League. Kheel recommended creation of a full-time Executive Vice Chairmanship superseding the present part-time post and charged with the administrative direction of all of the Committee's operations. While paying homage to the use of enforcement powers, he avoided a frontal attack on the controversial Troutman issue.

On the eve of his departure for the Middle East, the Vice President hastily summoned a meeting of the full Committee for the first time in some months, expecting, it is said, to win approval for the Kheel plan. But when the votes did not materialize, Johnson backed off. The activist members (Walter Reuther, Arthur Goldberg and Negro leaders among them) confidently put through a resolution affirming enforcement as the main purpose of the Committee's program and tabled the Kheel report pending further study by a subcommittee. The next day the White House announced what was described as Troutman's "resignation."

But though it might seem that a strong enforcement program has now been assured, the future of the Committee remains clouded by lingering reports that the Vice President plans to press for the Kheel reorganization plan on his return to Washington. Now that the air has been cleared by the Troutman resignation, the purported need for an Executive Vice Chairman to oversee rival factions can no longer be cited to justify reorganization, and the most unambiguous course for the Vice President in clarifying his intentions would be to drop the plan for an Executive Vice Chairman and stand by the existing program. An even more decisive step that would make clear his commitment to vigorous enforcement would be support for an expanded budget. The Kheel report took the present freeze on Committee funds for granted. And it is Johnson's reluctance to ruffle Southern Congressional friends that no doubt accounts for the failure of the Administration to seek more than the present budget of $425,000 – the same level as that of the weak predecessor committee headed by Richard Nixon.

Wiretapping Bill

There are two – but no more than two – uncontroversial assertions that can be made about wiretapping in the United States. One is that a great deal of wiretapping, of which there is a great deal, both police and private, runs the gamut from plain nasty to plain inexcusable, and that there ought to be a law. The other is that there is no effective law, either to prevent the sort of wiretapping that no responsible opinion condones, or to regulate any other sort. Early in the present session of Congress, Attorney General Kennedy recommended passage of a statute, drafted in the Department of Justice, and now under study by committees in the House and Senate, that would effectively forbid all private tapping, while subjecting to close regulation a limited area of wiretapping to be left open to law enforcement agencies. There is substantial agreement among professional observers that this is the best bill on wiretapping that has been put forth since A. G. Bell invented the problem. Nevertheless, many people entertain grave doubts about some of the bill's provisions, and some object to everything the bill would permit, though they welcome its prohibitions.

The bill can be understood and judged only against

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the background of existing wiretapping law, such as it is. The story begins with a great and stirring document, an opinion by Brandeis in *Olmstead* v *United States* (1928), saying that the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution, which prohibits "unreasonable searches and seizures," applies to wiretapping. As ill fortune would have it, this was a dissent. A majority of five held the Constitution silent on the search and seizure of so intangible a thing as a phone conversation.

In the Communications Act of 1934, Congress enacted that "no person not being authorized by the sender shall intercept any [telephone] communication and divulge [it]." This is blanket language, and no one knows what its drafters had in mind. They took it over from an earlier statute dealing with radio messages – a significantly different context – and it is at least doubtful that they were addressing themselves to the problem of tapping by law enforcement officers. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court held in 1937 that the Communications Act forbade tapping by federal law enforcement officers, and that evidence obtained through such tapping was not admissible in a federal criminal trial. Subsequently, the Court held that the blanket prohibition of the Act extends to state as well as federal law enforcement officers, even when tapping is done pursuant to court order. But the Court would not enforce this holding by reversing state criminal convictions obtained in trials in which wiretap evidence was used.

The upshot is chaos. State law enforcers tap and the FBI taps. In order to legalize FBI tapping, the Justice Department reads the Communications Act to forbid only tapping *and* divulging, not tapping alone. As is well known, the FBI seldom divulges anything. But the consequence has been to render it almost impossible to prosecute the battalions of private tappers, for they also take care not to "divulge" in the sense in which the Department uses the word, "to make public."

The Administration bill would forbid, under fairly severe penalties, all private tapping, "divulged" or no. It would unleash the FBI, inwardly and outwardly, by legalizing its tapping – in cases of espionage, sabotage, treason, sedition and the like, under authority of the Attorney General, and in cases of murder, kidnapping and certain "organized" crimes, under federal court order. It would permit state law enforcement officers to tap in murder, kidnapping and "organized" crime cases (but not in national security cases), pursuant to state court order. All other official tapping would be forbidden and punished, the same as private tapping, whether or not "divulged." Conditions for the showing of probable cause, which would be a prerequisite to the issuance of any tapping order by any court, state or federal, are described in detail. Orders are to be limited in time, though renewable for briefer periods. All orders, state or federal, are to be reported to the Department of Justice, and the statistics annually transmitted to Congress and presumably published. Finally, no unlawfully obtained wiretap evidence – that is, no wiretap evidence obtained otherwise than in accordance with the provisions of this statute – would be admissible in any trial in any United States or state court, or in any administrative, legislative or other federal or state proceeding.

Most of what is to be said both for and against this bill emerges clearly in two able recent reports by committees of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York. One report, by the Committee on the Bill of Rights, while commending the bill as a good one of its kind, opposes most of it on the absolute ground that no wiretaps of any sort should be allowed. This is not an easily tenable position. We tolerate physical searches pursuant to judical warrants issued on sworn proof of probable cause. Admittedly there is a difference between this and wiretapping. A man knows when his house has been searched, whereas he does not know when his phone has been tapped. The mere knowledge that wiretapping is possible therefore breeds a mood of vague fears and paranoias which the prospect of search warrants does not. Still it is difficult to mount a convincing argument that limited, controlled wiretapping should not also be permissible if safeguards required by the Fourth Amendment are imposed.

However, as the other report by the New York Bar points out, the Administration legislation goes much farther with respect to the so-called security crimes, in whose name so many crimes are committed. Nothing beyond the usual vague anxieties can be adduced to support the bill's provision allowing the FBI to tap in cases not only of treason, but of sedition and subversive activities, on the mere private say-so of the Attorney General – which in practice will often mean an assistant, or, more likely for the time being, J. Edgar Hoover. This provision is thoroughly objectionable, and it is heartening that the New York Bar committee opposes it, but generally approves the bill as a whole.

This committee's excellent report makes some additional suggestions, going perhaps more to detail, which are also well worth adopting. Like the Administration bill, however, it leaves untouched one further aspect of this many-faceted problem.

Congress has more than ample power to control traffic in the devices that are used for tapping wires. It can regulate their shipment in interstate commerce, and it can impose a special regulatory tax on them, as it has done with gambling devices and narcotics, for example. This would effectively help to enforce the prohibitions of the Administration bill. Furthermore, Congress should in this fashion reach also other electronic listening devices that do not depend on telephone wires, and that are even more offensive and dangerous.

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KENNEDY'S ALTERNATIVES IN DIVIDED GERMANY

After the Peace Treaty

Bonn

It is now almost universally accepted in Germany that Mr. Khrushchev is going to sign a separate peace treaty before Christmas with the East German Republic. It is generally but not universally expected that he will first offer the Western Powers a "last chance" of "liquidating the results of the war" by joining in an all-German peace conference which would have as its main aims the recognition of two sovereign German states – both to be invited into the UN – and the conversion of West Berlin into a neutralized, demilitarized and "free" city. It is widely supposed that Mr. Khrushchev will accompany this offer to the Western Powers with some kind of démarche in the UN based on the ostensible desire of the Communist bloc to "settle" the German question for good.

At the same time it is becoming more and more generally accepted that the Western Powers have no cut and dried plans for dealing with the new and intensely dangerous situation which will arise following the conclusion of a separate East German peace treaty. The German Federal Government clearly has no plans at all; it is as much committed as it has ever been to a policy of purely static defense on the political front. After years of varying but on the whole increasing pressure on West Berlin, the Federal Government is still reiterating the need to maintain Allied forces in the city, to safeguard the communications of its token garrisons and to stand pat on rights which derive from agreements signed, or in some cases made only verbally, 15 years and more ago.

In general the attitude of the Western Alliance has resembled that of the rabbit confronted by the stoat. The rabbit is confident that if it sits still it can put the approaching stoat out of its mind and begins to act only when the stoat is just about to pounce. The two chief protagonists of the policy of masterly inactivity – Dr. Adenauer in Bonn and General de Gaulle in Paris – have openly assumed that nothing untoward will happen so long as the West "stands firm." Communist pressure in Europe will slacken; Germany will be "reunified in freedom"; steadfastness will win the day. The one exception to this policy of self-mesmerization has been the Rusk probe of Soviet intentions. But even this limited example of initiative and good sense has met with little favor in Bonn or Paris. The West German Government has paid lip-service to Secretary Rusk's energy, but West German political leaders have made little secret of their skepticism about his efforts.

Dr. Adenauer, for one, has fallen into the habit of persistently opposing any and every effort to break the diplomatic deadlock in Europe. It is highly probable that, at 86, he is constitutionally incapable of modifying this negative approach.

Two years ago Adenauer speedily ended the one brief effort of Prime Minister Macmillan to gain the diplomatic offensive for the West in Europe. Macmillan's plan was to propose the creation of a zone of equalized armaments within the two Germanys running, let us say, 50 or 100 miles in breadth on either side of the German interzonal frontier. The plan had an obvious, immense attraction in that it might have constricted Soviet and East German armed forces into a totally inadequate corner of the East German Republic. Had it failed to do this it would still have left the West in a strong bargaining position – urging limitations of arms on a Soviet Union which sought to pretend that NATO was an aggressive military organization.

In the same way, Adenauer stamped on the Rusk plan (ardently supported by the leader of the British Labour Party, Mr. Gaitskell) for an International Authority to supervise Berlin's communications with the West. Adenauer first rejected this plan in January when talking to foreign correspondents in Bonn. Later, in the spring, he publicly objected to Mr. Rusk's ideas, using such fallacious arguments as that neutral states would refuse to accept responsibility for looking after Berlin's communications, and that the presence of German representatives on the Authority would involve some sort of "de facto" recognition of the East German regime.

Adenauer next rejected the proposal of West Berlin Mayor Willy Brandt for a 52-nation Peace Conference to be held in Berlin. The principal advantage in this proposal was that Mr. Khrushchev had personally advocated much the same thing – without working out the consequences. Brandt saw that a major peace conference, held literally on top of the Communist Wall, would tilt world opinion in favor of the Berliners and of the Federal Republic. The West would gain moral and diplomatic advantages irrespective of whether the peace conference achieved concrete results. But Dr. Adenauer dismissed the peace conference as purposeless and superfluous.

When Minister for All-German Affairs Lemmer suggested that Communist atrocities along the Berlin Wall

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should be carefully documented and a full statement put before the UN Commission for Human Rights, Willy Brandt supported this suggestion. What harm could it do? The view of the Federal Government – almost certainly inspired by Adenauer – was that it might make the UN into a "referee" on German questions. This would, in turn, weaken the sense of responsibility of the great powers for solving the German problem. There may be a grain of obscure logic in this argument, but it is difficult to perceive when East German refugees are being shot down and allowed to lie for hours in their own blood.

Brandt asked that Germans traveling to and from Berlin along the autobahn should be registered by the West German police at either end. He made this proposal because hundreds of Germans are arrested each year on the autobahn by the East German Peoples Police, are put in prison for indefinite periods, and sometimes never reappear. Registration would at least make immediate and energetic protest possible against this organized kidnaping. On August 12 and again on August 17 Brandt talked to Adenauer personally. But even on this admittedly relatively insignificant problem he was confronted with the ostrich-like argument that registration of motorists might cause alarm and discourage West Germans from visiting Berlin!

When the Berlin Wall was built the Western Powers grasped, like drowning men, at the lifeline offered by the Russians and East German Communists – continuing free access for Allied personnel to East Berlin. Since then American officials have been held up on the sector boundary for refusing to produce their credentials to Peoples Police. Allied access to East Berlin has been restricted to a single crossing-point in the Friedrich Strasse. And all Allied rights in Berlin have been put in doubt by the impending separate East German treaty.

One can buy a little peace of mind by hoping and assuming that restrictions imposed on one's allies will not necessarily hurt oneself. This is what the Western Powers have done over the Berlin Wall. The lesson will not have been lost on Mr. Khrushchev. Another turn of the Communist screw should secure another Western reflex of retraction. The Western position in Berlin need not be taken by direct assault; it can be gradually whittled away. A useful sounding-board of Communist success will be the West Berliners, whose impatience with their Western allies and protectors grows hourly. It reached one climax in the demonstrations against the Americans which took place in West Berlin on August 20 and the days following – the result of the shooting of an East German refugee by the Peoples Police on August 18 and the non-intervention of American troops in the Friedrich Strasse. This particular kind of incident could very easily be repeated many times over.

Western inactivity in Berlin is part and parcel of over-all static Western diplomacy. The last people to be blamed are the Western authorities on the spot, who take their orders from their governments and who have no independence of action whatever. The Western commandants in Berlin are generally professional soldiers with no experience of politics. By the time they have spent a couple of years in Berlin, and have formed clear-cut views of the situation, they have to pack up and go home. If there is to be a new Western approach to the problems of Berlin and Germany, it must be evolved by governments – and by intellectual effort.

Assuming that a static diplomacy has failed, and will fail more abjectly in the months ahead, I suggest that there are two alternative approaches which can be tried by the Western Powers. The first is to accept immediate realities and take the limited step of recognizing ("de facto," whatever that means) the East German Republic. The second is to evolve, and with no further delay, a more comprehensive approach to the larger long-term "German question."

The arguments in favor of "recognizing the facts" of the existing situation are well known. They have, in fact, been increasingly advanced by West Germans who might have been expected to regard them as heresies. Prominent among them have been writers in the weekly *Die Zeit* and the political periodical *Der Monat*. They have pointed out that the East German Republic will not cease to exist because West German politicians refer to it as a "nullity" and reassert the claim of the Federal Republic to represent the whole German people. They argue that recognition of the East German Republic would draw the sting from the Berlin situation, for the East German Republic would be given the status of a normal negotiating partner and would have to learn to behave like one. However, recognition would have to be "de facto" and not "de jure," and this proviso would pose an immediate problem. For where does the one begin and the other end? If the East German state became a member of the UN, then "de jure" recognition would surely be inevitable.

Another proviso would be attached to a policy of "recognition of the facts." This is that the division of Germany would never be accepted as final and enduring. Sense and order must some day be restored to the map of Europe. Sense and order cannot be said to exist as long as a great people remains divided, and as long as the mass of Germans feels unable to accept this division. While that situation persists there can be no certainty of peace in Europe.

The alternative to "recognition" of the status quo is to seek to persuade the Soviet Union that its experiment with a puppet East German Republic has proved a resounding failure. Its economy is shaky, its population is discontented and still overwhelmingly anti-Communist, its prestige is non-existent and its very existence

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is ephemeral. The Soviet Union has to be convinced that it will never be able to create a "second German nationality" in Leipzig and Dresden, that the 17 million East Germans will be everlastingly drawn by the magnet of the populous and prosperous West German state. But for this the Russians could long ago have discarded the hated Walter Ulbricht and installed a "national Communist" regime in East Berlin of the type that exists in Warsaw and Budapest. Instead, they have had to maintain a crypto-Stalinist regime in East Berlin – because any relaxation of iron control will permit East Germans to look ever more hopefully toward their West German neighbor.

Convincing the Russians is bound to be a long and uphill job. But there is a great deal that the West can do in the meantime. Plans for creating a zone of limited and equalized armaments in Germany should be revived – in order to loosen the Russian military grip on East Germany. The internationalization of the Berlin autobahn can be brought to the fore again. So can the Brandt plan for calling a 52-nation peace conference in Berlin, and giving the outside world a long look at the Communist Wall. The grand design of a European security system can be examined with a view to giving the Soviet Union solid guarantees against what are genuine if mistaken fears of German aggression.

The West should reflect that the Ulbricht regime in East Germany is probably weaker at this moment than at any time since the 1953 rising against it. This weakness can be exploited. So can the murder of East German citizens by the Peoples Police along the Berlin Wall. Martyrs should not be allowed to die in vain. The arguments in favor of forceful Western diplomatic counterpressure now, rather than recognition under pressure of the "fact" of East German sovereignty, are many and cogent. The Kennedy Administration should re-assess them. For no one else will. With his Tory Party tottering Macmillan cannot afford another snub from Adenauer. De Gaulle is frankly uninterested in solving the German problem – as long as France can dominate a European Community which contains only the rump-Germany of the Federal Republic. Adenauer is opposed to any decisive move.

Adenauer has always posed as the apostle of a "strong" diplomacy. But it seems that he has never understood that a static diplomacy is not of itself strong and is, in fact, automatically and inevitably weak so long as it leaves all initiative in the hands of the enemy. Moreover, behind Adenauer's belief in static diplomacy lurks the dangerous mythology – discussed in my dispatch in these pages two weeks ago – that a European "Third Force," based on a Franco-German entente, could create its own independent nuclear striking force and command strength enough to remain independent of the two super powers.

TERENCE PRITTIE

US DIPLOMACY HAS BEEN THE ALLY OF THE ITALIAN RIGHT

The New Frontier and the New Italy

Rome

Italian governments have been traditionally to the right of the electorate. As a result, strong "protest" pressures from the left were built up, and after being driven underground by the Fascist dictatorship, they emerged in force at the end of World War II only to be largely channeled and captured by the Communists. Postwar Italy has had the largest Communist Party in the West and the only large Socialist Party closely allied with the Communists. The democratic, pro-Western coalitions which governed after 1947 could be labelled as "centrist" insofar as they were anti-Communist and anti-Fascist, but their majorities did not truly represent the center of the political spectrum since they excluded over one-third of the electorate on one side (those who voted Communist and Socalist) but only one-tenth on the other (those who voted Monarchist and Neo-Fascist).

The only way to have corrected this situation would have been to strike on a bold course of social and economic reform designed to appeal to the bulk of the Communist and Socialist voters. And indeed some tentative stabs were made at such old issues as the development of the southern part of the country, land tenure and the revamping of the cumbersome, outdated and generally inequitable tax system. But, hampered by mounting conservative pressure within the coalitions, progress was too little and came too late to meet pent-up demands. The government suffered a slow but steady erosion on its left flank and was able to hold on to its slim majority only by gaining ground on its right,

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at the expense of the declining Monarchist movement. Even the great economic expansion of recent years, unattended by adequate social progress and institutional modernization, failed to produce political dividends for the government coalitions.

This state of affairs aroused a fitful concern in American diplomatic circles, which reached peaks of anxiety on the eve of each election but quickly gave way to a feeling of relief when it turned out that somehow the government parties had managed to scrape through once more. It didn't seem to matter much that the domestic policies of the pro-Western governments not only drove more and more voters into the arms of the Communist left but tended to identify the US and the Atlantic alliance with an outdated status quo in Italy herself.

During the Eisenhower years the attitude of many United States officials contributed directly to such an identification. They gave the impression that American sympathies lay with the conservative groups within the center alignment. Spokesmen for the democratic left were ignored or held at arm's length as dangerous radicals – or at least troublemakers bent on "rocking the boat." The same American officials appeared to disregard or minimize new opportunities portended by the tendency of many Nenni Socialists to draw away from their old Communist allies. When in 1960 a short-lived government relying on the parliamentary support of the Neo-Fascists was formed, Embassy officers were promptly seen dining in town with extreme right-wing Catholics and well-known Neo-Fascists, including a relative of the late Benito Mussolini.

Then the Kennedy Administration came to power. In retrospect, it is easy to conclude that progressive-minded Italians expected too much too soon. Months went by before they could notice any change in the American approach to Italian affairs. The appointment of a new Ambassador to Rome was delayed. The "old Italian hands" still clung to the experience and contacts developed when the traditional center government had not yet outlived its usefulness and when the position of the Nenni Socialists seemed to bar forever any left-of-center combination. Over and above bureaucratic lags there was a lag in thinking, a failure to read and properly interpret the implications of the material and psychological changes that were taking place in Italy as a result of the country's economic growth and of increased contacts with more advanced Western societies.

By the time John F. Kennedy came to the White House a most dynamic change in Italian politics had already begun and within 12 months the country was to have a new kind of government – one still controlled by pro-Western forces but one looking to the Nenni Socialists for the parliamentary support required to put across a New Dealish program of social reform and institutional modernization. Through most of those months, however, leading Italian politicians, including top representatives of the ruling Christian-Democratic Party, were left under the impression that many US officials did not believe such a change would actually occur, or that they continued to harbor strong misgivings about it. Only at the last moment was this impression partly corrected by some signs that the new center-left government might be viewed with benevolent neutrality and might actually enjoy some sympathy in circles close to the White House. No wonder Roman wits cracked: "We have always been told that Vatican diplomacy is very slow and cautious; on this one it has beaten the Americans by six months at least!"

Since then things have changed somewhat. One way to measure change is follow the mounting attacks unleashed by extreme rightist papers against high State Department officials, Ambassador Reinhardt and "White House advisers" – all of whom are accused of "aiding and abetting the center-left government which is leading Italy down the path to neutralism and Communism." There has been a gradual widening of American contacts with the democratic left, and these have not been confined to people holding official positions in the center-left government but have extended to Nenni Socialists who have played a major role in loosening their party's ties with the Communists.

On the whole, therefore, the "diplomatic gap" has been narrowed – a trend which has become more evident since the local elections of June 10, generally considered as the first major test for the "new course" in Italian politics. For the first time both the Communists and the extreme right parties lost ground.

It would be too much to say, however, that the gap has been closed altogether. There is still a tendency on the part of US officials to emphasize the difficulties and risks of a center-left approach rather than its advantages and achievements. This tendency is strengthened by the coverage of Italian events by some of the major US newspapers and magazines.

On foreign policy, progressive and pro-Western Italians feel that the present government should by now have dispelled all suspicions that the support of the Nenni Socialists would mean a shift toward neutralism. They are not sure that US diplomacy fully appreciates how able and willing the present Italian government is to take a constructive interest in such major international issues as the timing and scope of British participation in the European Communities, the further development of European economic and political integration, the coordination of Western nuclear defense, and aid to the underdeveloped world. (Here Italy, thanks to her own fresh experience as an "emerging country," can offer a unique contribution.)

But above all, progressive Italians are wondering

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why, at the very moment when their country strives at long last to bring about reforms and institutions broadly similar to those adopted in the US a generation ago, the representatives of the New Frontier have not grabbed with both hands the opportunity to enhance American prestige by expressing great interest in what the Italian government is trying to do. "And all it would take," one of those Italians who holds an important job just below Cabinet rank told me recently, "is to project a true image of what your country has achieved with the New Deal and of what it now stands for with the New Frontier."

Here is the crux of the matter. In past years there has been little if any effort to correct the often-distorted image of the US projected by the large circulation Italian press, which may be independent of political parties but not from economic interests. America has been publicized as a technological giant rather than as a leader seeking modern democratic solutions to basic social and economic problems (tax enforcement, regulation of economic activities in the public interest, etc.). To quote another knowledgeable Italian, the US Congress "is better known through the reports of the Internal Security Subcommittee than through the reports of the Antitrust Subcommittee." In the last few months some progress has been made on this front, but speeches by Embassy representatives or by visiting Americans are still more likely to dwell on the "US Customs Court" or "The Hero in Hemingway" than on tax enforcement, the Tennessee Valley Authority or the Food and Drug Administration.

In short, the United States is today less easily taken in by the kind of Italian conservative who denounces as Communist even a proposal to allow the government to check on bank accounts for income tax purposes. What is still urgently required is adequate communication with the many Italians who have been unable so far to establish a real rapport with Americans. The US needs to sharpen its image as a model of that forward-looking, social-minded capitalism that Italy increasingly wants and needs.

LEO J. WOLLEMBORG

WHAT LIES BEHIND THIS PASSIONATE HATRED?

De Gaulle Walks Alone

Paris

The recent attempt on General de Gaulle's life has intruded abruptly into the relaxed and somnolent mood of summer vacationtime in France. Once more the French people must face the harsh realities of the Algerian aftermath in their country. As usual, no doubt, the public marveled at the French President's extraordinary good luck; and as usual, his unruffled self-possession added luster to the superman image he has patiently built up over the years. More importantly, however, the French people have been forced to recognize three basic truths: first, that political assassination, *coups d'état*, and similar mechanisms of force and violence have become as entrenched in the French political way of life as in any of the South American republics; secondly, that the Secret Army Organization (OAS) has survived the independence of Algeria and there remains every reason to dread its exploits; and lastly, that if the attempt on General de Gaulle's life had been successful, the present institutions of the Fifth Republic would have been incapable of mustering the show of strength needed to protect the constitutional regime.

Experienced observers of French internal affairs had long since analyzed and pointed out these three truths, but heretofore neither French nor foreign public opinion had been given such spectacular confirmation of their accuracy. Today, however, the truth must be faced. On the international front, France is developing an extremely ambitious strategy (her policy on Berlin, on the disarmament question, and on the nuclear strategy problem); and yet, at the same time, her internal situation has never been more precariously balanced and fraught with danger. The reason for this is that the everyday political life of the country is irrevocably bound up with a very supra-ordinary destiny, namely that of Charles de Gaulle.

The problem here is truly one of *destiny*. The mystique of *de Gaullisme* has attained such wide acceptance that when that most literary and romantic of de Gaulle's cabinet ministers, the great writer André Malraux, learned of the hairbreadth escape of the French President, he exclaimed that death in this manner would have been the most glorious possible end for this illustrious martyr to the greatness of France. Self-sacrificial though it may seem, this concept of himself as a Man of Destiny does serve to explain the serene courage and imperturbable composure with which

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Charles de Gaulle receives all the blows which fate reserves for him.

However, nations in general and political figures in particular do not live in a world of haloed romance. Little attention is being paid in Paris right now to the fact that the Russian command post has been closed down in Berlin, although this is the main concern of the Quai d'Orsay; England's participation in the Common Market and the space orbiting of Soviet and American cosmonauts are likewise receiving scant attention from the French public. For after a period of deliverance and pause, the nation's attention is turning once more to the consequences of the political chaos in Algeria, and to the repercussions of the return to Metropolitan France of the disgruntled military and the embittered French citizenry of Algeria.

From the viewpoint of almost all the 600,000 repatriated French from Algeria, as well as of a large segment of the Army and the police who had been living in North Africa, the abandonment of French Algeria is considered an act of forfeiture and a treasonable policy. To the outsider, such blindness may appear to be cause for indignation, and it may seem surprising for so many men of good will and good sense to be clinging to traditions of the past. The fact still remains unchanged: on the subject of Algeria, political maturity is lacking and the force of prejudice is strong.

And unfortunately, playing into the very hands of these backward forces, the disorder and upheaval attendant upon the Algerians' accession to their independence lends fuel to the retrograde sentiments of all those groups who wanted to integrate Moslem and Arab Algeria into the Catholic French Republic. It is extremely difficult to convince those who have lived for generations as settlers in a given land that decolonization was inevitable. It is even harder when decolonization does not bring immediate and visible progress in its wake.

After seven years of war it is not unexpected for the French Army and the French nationalists to create a chauvinist crisis; the former, after all, feels that it has been cheated of victory, and the latter believe that they have lost their own territory by arbitrary amputation. More abnormal, however, is the fact that the media for expressing this crisis are the weapons of terror, of gangsterism, of racketeering and hold-ups. It is known, for example, that the forest-fires which have disturbed vacationers on the Côte d'Azur this summer were often set by OAS men, by deserting Legionnaires, or by discharged and rootless parachutists. Most particularly, however, the prime target of these subversive undertakings is the President himself. This is so obvious that a responsible member of the French police force has been quoted as saying recently: "We have reached the point where we no longer wonder if they *want* to kill General de Gaulle, or even if they *intend* to kill him, but simply *when* will they do it?" Yet when someone pointed out to this official that the police have at their disposal every means of protecting the general, he replied: "Of course we do. But on the one hand de Gaulle loathes protection and often insists on going for walks completely alone; and besides this, of the 600,000 repatriots from Algeria now in France, there are several thousand suicide candidates who would not hesitate to throw themselves under his car with a bomb." (De Gaulle has, however, now agreed to allow somewhat more adequate police protection of his own person.)

What lies behind the passionate hatred of de Gaulle? The experts all agree that the OAS has no plan for an immediate take-over of power following a possible assassination of the President. It would appear that the second-string elements are simply bent on satisfying a thirst for vengeance. They would like to punish the person whom they consider responsible for all the misfortunes and setbacks of France. The leaders, on the other hand, have more realistic, or at least less desperate goals in mind: they feel certain that if de Gaulle could be eliminated now while Algeria is in a state of turmoil, there would be a rebirth of nationalist feeling in France which would contribute to the onset of civil war; then, under the pretext of a Communist threat, the Army could move in and settle the conflict. In this way a strongly united national government could be formed under the influence of those who favor the reconquest of Algeria.

Of course this is an unreasoned, fallacious and futile scheme. In the prosperous France of 1962 there is no force strong enough to carry a venture of this Fascist type. On the contrary, it is conceivable that if de Gaulle were eliminated there would be a re-marshaling of the large republican groups of the Center and of the Left – a regrouping of forces which has hitherto been prevented by de Gaulle's Atlantic- and European-oriented policies. One thing is certain: the superman regime cannot survive the vanishing of the superman himself, and the institutions which de Gaulle set up so that he could govern do not favor easy successions and painless transitions. The easiest way to prevent a nation from becoming incarnated in a single individual is by eliminating that individual.

For the moment, however, while the French police are busily trying to protect him, General de Gaulle's great concern is the probability of direct negotiations between Kennedy and Khrushchev. Before he dies, de Gaulle would passionately like to make France a member of an Atlantic "Directoire." After the attack on his life, all he had to say was: "These people are certainly bad shots." And with that, back he went to work, the first item on his agenda: Berlin.

Jean Daniel

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A Cop Becomes a Cato

W. H. Ferry, a reformed college professor who once instructed a student named J. F. Kennedy, broke into the news recently by laying unhallowed hands upon the Lord's Anointed. Ferry is at present one of those industrious conversationalists who, at Santa Barbara, California, spend their time examining our democratic institutions with a certain respect for fact. But it seems that in his time off he is both a voter and a party man, and at a Democratic conclave early in August he whooped it up in a way that scared the Fund for the Republic into a hasty explanation that Mr. Ferry was speaking on his own time as an individual, not as a representative either of the Fund or of the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions.

What raised gooseflesh on the Fund, as well it might, was Ferry's derisive comment on a recent deliverance by J. Edgar Hoover. In the previous week Hoover had unburdened himself of his usual blood-curdling warning against the ever-present menace of Communist spies. Ferry made the point that since Hoover is our official "spy-swatter," and since he has been given many years and many millions to accomplish the work, if spies still proliferate it would seem he is not up to the job and we ought to get another spy-swatter.

As applied to any other government job-holder this would be accepted as plain common sense, but not as applied to Hoover. His is one of two names that, like the Lord's, cannot be taken in vain by any public speaker without dire peril. The other is that of General Douglas MacArthur.

Some future historian undoubtedly will find in this phenomenon material for a doctoral dissertation on the mysteries of mass psychology as demonstrated in the greatest democracy of the 20th Century. Why should so many Americans prefer, as their supreme military hero, the one general who always got licked? Why should so many see the apotheosis of copperdom in the one cop who constantly bemoans the danger presented by the criminals he can't catch?

One may reasonably surmise that the future historian, rummaging through the dusty archives of our time, will infer that the skill most rapturously admired by Americans of a certain type is not skillful performance of the task assigned, but skill at passing the buck. Roosevelt, not failure to get the planes off the ground in spite of eight hours' warning, was responsible for the defeat on Bataan; Truman, not a fantastically incompetent intelligence service, for the Yalu.

In the case of Hoover, however, others than Ferry cling to an opposite opinion. It is their theory that J. Edgar Hoover was once a first-rate cop, but is now a third-rate Cato. He was first given extensive powers to break up the kidnaping racket, and he broke it up, but fast! He was then commissioned to prevent bank-robbing from becoming a national industry, and the way he mowed down the Dillingers and such was a marvel to behold.

This gave the man well-deserved prestige, based on solid achievement. But when war was followed by cold war his energies were diverted to treason, which the Constitution says shall consist of an overt act sworn to by two witnesses, but which a panic-stricken citizenry construes as including not only criminal acts but Dangerous Thoughts, also. Thus the sometime officer of the law was converted into a *censor morum*, the good cop became a bum Cato.

Ferry quotes Hoover as asserting that there is among us an advance detachment of Communists with the "capacity to pervert our thinking and destroy the spiritual supports which form the foundation of our freedom." This should be highly interesting to those who consider the Judeo-Christian religious tradition the spiritual support of freedom. If the Communists have the capacity to wipe that out, they are considerably more potent than the gates of hell which, we are assured, shall not prevail against it; and it is no wonder the gumshoe boys are helpless against them.

It is just possible, though, that what Ferry has done with his apparent blasphemy is what the small boy did when he exclaimed that the emperor had no clothes. A popular illusion, once penetrated, often collapses like a punctured balloon. Our system has no proper place for a Cato and would have none even if the original Roman were available. To strive to construct a synthetic one is folly, and to sacrifice to that folly an efficient policeman is shocking waste.

However, it is a wasteful country and in nothing more recklessly so than in its misuse of good men by placing them in positions to which they are not adapted. It is really no cause for wonder that a country capable of electing Eisenhower its president should also be eager to make Hoover its moral guardian.

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McNAMARA'S STRATEGY – II

When on June 16 Secretary of Defense McNamara set forth at Ann Arbor the rationale for "city sparing" in a nuclear war, he precipitated a national controversy concerning not only the merits of his new strategy but precisely what it was that he had committed the United States to uphold. In the July 30 issue of The New Republic, *Michael Brower contended that the McNamara proposal was "inextricably linked . . . to a counterforce first strike strategy" advocated within the Air Force. Robert E. Osgood, Research Associate at the Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research and a professor at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, argues that "a counterforce capability may be for a retaliatory strike and the counterforce requirements for a first and retaliatory strike are different." Favoring retaliatory counterforce, he still fears that the McNamara nuclear strategy may become "a substitute for conventional resistance," with "disastrous" results. Mr. Osgood is the author of* Limited War *and* NATO: The Entangling Alliance.

Nuclear Arms: Uses and Limits

by Robert E. Osgood

The dilemma of modern armaments is that the will to use nuclear weapons is indispensable as a deterrent to nuclear and perhaps major conventional aggression; yet if the US were to exercise its will and use anything like its full arsenal of nuclear weapons it would destroy the very things it was fighting to save. The Eisenhower Administration simply accepted this dilemma and relied upon the horror of nuclear warfare to deter the Russians from making a theoretical conundrum into a practical problem. Eisenhower increased the West's dependence upon America's nuclear weapons while conceding that a nuclear war would be "self-defeating." The Kennedy Administration, on the other hand, has been unwilling to accept the nuclear dilemma. It believes that a threat which would be self-defeating if carried out makes an inadequate deterrent, incompatible with the cohesion and bargaining power of NATO, and worse than useless if deterrence fails.

The new Administration's first attempt to overcome the nuclear dilemma was to increase the free world's capacity for non-nuclear resistance: to provide "a wider choice than humiliation or all-out nuclear action." But despite some strengthening of America's conventional capabilities the NATO allies have done little – most of them nothing – to increase their conventional capabilities in Europe. They have either opposed or acquiesced unenthusiastically in America's strategy of "flexible response." Hence it remains doubtful that NATO's conventional forces could contain large-scale Soviet conventional aggression in Europe. Stuck with inadequate conventional capabilities in the face of Soviet brinkmanship in Berlin, the Kennedy Administration has engaged in the difficult task of simultaneously restating America's determination to use nuclear weapons if necessary and trying to persuade the allies to increase their conventional capabilities so that this will be unnecessary.

This predicament has given added impetus to the Administration's other major military innovation, intended to overcome its inherited nuclear dilemma: the strategic counterforce or "no-cities" strategy that McNamara outlined publicly at Ann Arbor in June and privately, in more detail, to the NATO ministers at Athens in May. The US, according to this strategy, would strike at those Soviet missiles and bombers which could strike major American and European targets, while holding in reserve enough relatively invulnerable missiles to devastate Soviet cities. This would, perhaps, dissuade the Russians from engaging in a mutually suicidal exchange of cities.

Clearly, this strategy of "controlled response" requires a drastic change in the nuclear plans of the Eisenhower Administration, which called for striking a vast array of civil and military targets in a kind of automatic spasm of devastation. The architects of the new strategy are convinced it is the only one which provides any chance of permitting a favorable resolution to a nuclear war. None of them claims that the civilian destruction would be anything but terrible; but, as opposed to either a strategy of undiscriminating

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military and civil destruction or a strategy of "finite deterrence" designed only to strike at cities, they contend that this counterforce strategy might save tens of millions of American lives and comparable proportions of European and Russian lives. This would render nuclear war a more rational, less apocalyptic recourse.

The timing and method of announcing the no-cities strategy were prompted partly by the Administration's desire to discourage the French from pursuing the development of an independent nuclear force. And as Michael Brower suggests (*The New Republic*, July 30), the Administration also wanted to bolster allied confidence in (and Russian respect for) America's determination to use nuclear weapons rather than countenance defeat in a major European conventional conflict. But the basic motive for developing the strategy lies in President Kennedy's desire to have a rational option if a nuclear war must be fought for *any* reason, including some technical accident, human mistake, or a Soviet first-strike launched out of miscalculation or irrational impulse.

Like most other strategic innovations, this one is also derived from technological developments. Recent advances in the Soviet capacity to destroy American cities have made it clearer than ever that all-out massive retaliation is a two-way street. At the same time, the achievement of a relatively invulnerable nuclear force has made it possible to conceive of holding a countercity force in reserve while using other nuclear weapons, greatly improved in accuracy and reliability, with restraint and political discrimination. Finally, the Kennedy Administration discovered that not only was there no "missile gap" but in fact the US strategic force would, at least through 1967, be so superior to the Soviet force as to be capable of absorbing a nuclear attack and still destroying most of the Soviets' remaining striking power.

A Moral, Political and Military Imperative

As long as nuclear weapons (and hence the chance of nuclear war) exist, I cannot see the objection to taking measures that might enable both sides to keep a war under political control and insofar as possible spare cities. On the contrary, I consider it morally, politically, and militarily imperative not to forfeit even the slightest opportunity to achieve this objective. Nevertheless, the official description of the no-cities strategy leaves me with some anxious questions and doubts about *when* and *how* we ought to plan on fighting such a war.

Unfortunately, however, what seem to me to be valid questions and doubts are likely to get confused with some invalid ones. Some people oppose any effort to make warfare less destructive – on the supposition that only so long as war appears to be inevitably self-defeating have we any hope for peace. Other more sophisticated critics argue, as Brower does, that the new counterforce strategy unstabilizes the military equilibrium because it encourages a Soviet preemptive attack. This argument, aside from exaggerating the willingness of one state to launch a preemptive nuclear attack without the most material evidence of enemy intentions to strike first, seems to me to overlook the fact that the US could virtually destroy the USSR even after a preemptive Soviet attack. Thus even if the Soviets are convinced the US is about to strike, their best hope for survival is in the possibility they are wrong rather than in the possibility of weakening our strike by going first.

Brower and others also mistakenly identify a counterforce capability with a first strike strategy, overlooking the fact that a counterforce capability may be intended for a retaliatory strike and that the counterforce requirements for a first and retaliatory strike are different. In contending that a retaliatory counterforce strike is (or soon will be) useless, they ignore the probability that for technical and economic reasons significant numbers of Soviet weapons, including those on missile bases with reload capacity, will remain vulnerable to detection and destruction.

Finally, there are those who oppose *any* counterforce capability because it holds open the possibility that under extreme provocation the US might initiate the use of nuclear weapons. These individuals do not appreciate the difficulty of distinguishing counterforce from countercity capabilities. More important, they rarely spell out what they think the US should (or would) do in the event that NATO forces prove incapable of containing a conventional European conflict. They argue for strengthening NATO's conventional capability over the next few years without saying what the US should do in the interim.

To me the most legitimate question raised about the McNamara speech by its critics is whether the Administration plans to rely heavily on this new nuclear strategy as a substitute for conventional resistance – as a kind of tidied-up version of massive retaliation. If so, the political if not the military results will indeed be disastrous, for not even the most carefully planned controls will purge nuclear war of its unique fearsomeness or relieve the alliance of the liabilities of depending on nuclear weapons as the chief backstop for diplomacy. The most optimistic estimates of civil destruction indicate that a counterforce war with Russia, although less catastrophic than a countercity war, would be unconscionably devastating even if both sides meticulously observed the rules. Therefore, insofar as the Administration's counterforce strategy is intended to support a first-strike strategy, it will suffer – as a deterrent and as an instrument of policy – much the same liabilities as the old massive-retaliation strategy. Con-

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sidering the Soviet predilection – at least in the past – for keeping its incursions well below the threshold of provocation that would confront the West with a clear-cut choice between humiliation and nuclear war, it is hard to believe that a counterforce strategy will make a substantial difference in the deterrence of hot war or the fortunes of cold war.

Nuclear versus Conventional Build-ups

The point is worth making because some of the military, even though they were originally advocates of all-out, cities-plus-counterforce retaliation, will acclaim the new strategy, in the words of the July issue of *Air Force*, not as a switch but as "an endorsement of the Air Force's doctrine of counterforce capability" – as a vindication of a first-strike win-the-war strategy and a powerful instrument of coercion against Khrushchev. And some European officials, anxious for any excuse to avoid building up conventional capabilities, may come to welcome the new strategy as a more plausible and respectable version of massive retaliation.

If the Administration wishes to avoid this interpretation – and I believe it does – it must evidently clarify its intentions. One should not expect it to renounce the option of initiating the use of nuclear weapons as long as NATO cannot be confident of handling a conventional assault conventionally. Consequently, it must apply the new strategy to the first-use as well as to the retaliatory-use of nuclear weapons. Yet, considering the pressures here and in Europe to regard nuclear deterrence as a substitute for a conventional buildup, the government must continually emphasize – as McNamara, with no help from the press, tried to do in his Ann Arbor speech – that NATO urgently needs to build the kind of capabilities that will enable it to reduce (I would say abolish) its dependence on a first-strike strategy. For, in my view, the only persuasive argument for the new counterforce strategy is that *if* nuclear weapons are used, either initially or in response to a Soviet nuclear attack, it may provide an indispensable opportunity to fight and conclude a nuclear war with the fabric of governments and societies intact. It should not effect the decision *when* to use nuclear weapons but only *how* to use them.

Even on the latter question – *how* to use nuclear weapons – the feasibility of the strategy McNamara outlined is open to question. Because of the immense destructive potential involved and the terrible uncertainties about how weapons and especially people will perform in a completely unprecedented extremity, there must be serious doubts about the chances of limiting a strategic counterforce war. Even assuming that they are determined to try, will both sides be able to find and hit bombers and missiles with sufficient precision (*i.e.* sufficiently slight collateral damage to cities) to maintain the limiting conditions of a counterforce war? Will they deliver the least destructive and most accurate explosions needed for the target or will they use a surplus of destruction – ground bursts, super-megaton explosions, and saturation attacks – in order to be surer of eliminating counterforce targets? If one power fears that it is being disarmed or that its material, social, and political fabric is in jeopardy while the enemy's is not, will it surrender? Or will it try countercity exchanges to get a more favorable settlement and postwar situation? Suppose that we were to succeed in virtually eliminating the Soviet counterforce capability but that the Russians controlled part of Western Europe, retained their countercity reserve, and declined to surrender. What would we do then?

These are only a few of the questions one should worry about. To maximize the feasibility of fighting a strategic counterforce war rather than a countercity war, we must move missile and bomber bases in the US, and so far as possible in Europe, farther away from cities. It is also imperative to get the nuclear weapons assigned to the Supreme Commander of NATO forces in Europe under something like the central command and control system that has been applied to America's strategic weapons. Under Eisenhower and Norstad, NATO forces on the Continent became increasingly dependent on a variety of nuclear weapons controlled at the divisional level. This trend must be reversed, as the present Administration seems to realize.

Equally important, the concept of employing nuclear weapons as instruments of policy must be clarified. Some proponents of a counterforce strategy now advocate "winning" a nuclear war by disarming the enemy in an all-out attack on his strategic nuclear weapons. Even if that were technically possible (and if it is now, it probably will not be in several years), any all-out effort with nuclear weapons – strategic counterforce, countercity, or tactical – is likely to be incompatible with a useful limitation of the war. The prerequisite of limiting and controlling a nuclear war is that both sides seek to end it long before either has exhausted its full capacity for destruction.

This means that the end of a strategic counterforce war must come well before one or the other side is disarmed. It means that the object of fighting must be to bargain for a mutually acceptable truce or political settlement, not to overwhelm the enemy's military forces. When McNamara said at Ann Arbor that the basic strategy in a general nuclear war should be the same as in conventional wars of the past ("that is to say, principal military objectives . . . should be the destruction of the enemy's military forces"), he seemed to support a conception of war that caused immense destruction even in World War I and could today make

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a mockery of the "controlled response." Perhaps there are circumstances in which a nuclear war could not be stopped before the enemy's weapons were substantially destroyed, especially if the US rather than the USSR initiates the use of these weapons after a deliberate Soviet conventional attack in Europe. But in other circumstances, especially if war begins unintentionally, both sides must be willing and even anxious to halt nuclear hostilities without carrying the counterforce duel to the point of exhaustion.

But if the objective of a nuclear war is to couple measured blows with political bargaining in order to negotiate a quick end of hostilities, one wonders if sufficient official attention has been given to two possible alternatives, or possibly complements, to a strategic counterforce war: local tactical nuclear strikes and limited nuclear reprisals upon cities or other valuable civil targets. I think there are decisive objections to the latter alternative but it would still be a better last resort than an all-out attack on enemy cities. The Administration seems to have concluded that a tactical nuclear war in Europe would be so difficult to keep under effective central command and control, so susceptible to rapid escalation, and so devastating for the NATO ally whose territory was the battlefield, that limited strategic warfare would be a far more advantageous means of bargaining. Perhaps so, but if this view is correct we had better eliminate all the so-called battlefield nuclear weapons in Europe – the Davy Crocketts, Honest Johns, Sergeants, and Pershings – as quickly as allied sensitivities will permit. Otherwise we may not have a chance to employ our preferred response – controlled strategic counterforce war.

Who Will Decide What in NATO?

Finally, one must question the implications of the Administration's new strategy for America's relations with her NATO allies. McNamara's Ann Arbor speech in June and his Athens presentation in May were intended first to reassure our allies that the United States will destroy the Soviet nuclear weapons aimed at Western Europe as well as at the United States and second, to dissuade them (especially France) from trying to rely upon their own nuclear weapons – which he said would be "dangerous, expensive, prone to obsolescence, and lacking in credibility" – instead of on ours. Allied governments, when they have reconciled themselves to the passing of the Norstad regime and have adjusted to the new concept, may indeed be reassured by America's counterforce capabilities and her confidence in them, if only because they think it will make an American first-strike more credible and relieve them of the necessity of increasing their conventional capabilities. But they are not all likely to be persuaded by McNamara's military logic that they should be content indefinitely with America's virtual monopoly of nuclear ownership and decision-making in the alliance. Militarily this monopoly makes sense; but it requires strong, self-assertive nations to leave a life-and-death decision entirely in the hands of the US, and that is likely to make less and less political sense.

The logical alternative to several independently-controlled nuclear forces in the alliance is some form of multilateral control. Yet it seems extremely unlikely that the allies can agree upon any workable method of sharing the crucial political decision to use nuclear weapons. In the absence of such a method the US has wisely declined to surrender its exclusive political control of American nuclear warheads or to encourage the development of other nuclear forces. Probably the best the US can do to discourage nuclear separatism in the alliance is to share the strategic planning process more broadly and induce those allies with independent nuclear forces to coordinate their weapons systems and battle plans with those of the US.

But here the new counterforce strategy encounters what seems like an insurmountable contradiction between its requirements of military centralization and the realities of political decentralization in the alliance. If such a strategy is to work the target system must, as McNamara said, be "indivisible" and the weapons must be "centrally controlled." Moreover, if we hope to fight a war of "controlled response," the selection of targets and the use of weapons must be under a unified, flexible and secure organization, with an elaborate set of procedures and equipment for gathering and assessing wartime intelligence and for making, communicating, and executing top-level decisions under unprecedented stress.

Central control in this sense is clearly incompatible with any real independence of choice by more than one government (or supranational organ) in the use of weapons. Even the existing system of America's releasing warheads to allied units during nuclear combat might undermine a controlled response if allied governments exercised independent judgment in using the warheads. Yet if the allies take the new strategy of controlled response seriously, they can hardly fail to realize that the selection of targets and the choice of weapons in a nuclear war involve the most vital kind of political decision, which they cannot readily abnegate. Consequently, to the extent the allies accept the new strategy they are likely to become more rather than less dissatisfied with America's monopoly.

Like other aspects of the nuclear dilemma, this is not an argument for a strategy of unlimited civil destruction. It is, above all, an argument for reducing to the absolute minimum the dependence of allied security upon nuclear weapons.

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Slums and Schools—I

by Christopher Jencks

For more than a century the rural poor have been pouring into American cities. Up to World War I they came mainly from the overpopulated European countryside to cities which needed unskilled industrial labor. Since World War II they have come from the now-overpopulated American countryside to cities so mechanized and even automated that unskilled labor has little market value. But still they come – Negroes and Puerto Ricans in the East, Spanish Americans and Indians in the West, marginal farmers and hillbillies everywhere, all trying to jump in a single generation from the Eighteenth Century to the Twentieth. Often they fall short. Unable to adapt themselves to the requirements of a post-industrial economy which mainly values the bureaucratic virtues, they fill the jails and mental hospitals, crowd the unemployment offices and relief rolls, blight housing and recreation facilities. Not only do they threaten to bankrupt the metropolis, but they (and their children and grandchildren) make it uninhabitable -- for themselves as well as for the middle classes which originally shaped it.

Nor do the slums in question show very many signs of disappearing, or even diminishing. Urban renewal may move them away from the commercial center of the city – from the West Side to Newark and from the East Side to Queens. Public housing may even change the physical face of the slum beyond recognition. But the impoverishment and disorder which are the essence of a slum seem to remain. They can only be eliminated when the slum dweller himself changes.

Some would disagree, but it appears to me that the urban poor change only when they acquire respectable and responsible jobs. So long as they spend eight or ten hours a day in repetitive, soul-destroying work they have neither the courage nor the energy to fight the loneliness, the squalor, and the impulsive hedonism which make the slum so appalling – and so vibrant. Fortunately the number of jobs a man can do without losing touch with himself is steadily increasing, and the number which turn their occupants into automatons decreasing. In the years ahead we will need more teachers and fewer charwomen, more chemists and fewer miners, more auto salesmen and fewer auto workers, more IBM executives and fewer filing clerks.

The only difficulty is that while the economy is changing in a way which makes the eventual liquidation of the slums at least conceivable, young people are not seizing the opportunities this change presents. Too many are dropping out of school before graduation (more than half in many slums); too few are going to college (less than twenty percent in many areas). As a result there are serious shortages of teachers, nurses, doctors, technicians, and scientifically trained executives, but 4.5 million unemployables.

What is the trouble? Fundamentally, it is that the technologists are transforming work faster than educators can transform workers. The slum school is now being asked to do in one generation what it fomerly did in three, and it can't do it. Instead of making the first generation off the farm into literate but unskilled factory workers, making their children into craftsmen, office employees, and small businessmen, and their grandchildren into professional and managerial experts, the slum school must complete the whole cycle at once.

There are no tested formulae for meeting this challenge. But I will outline two tentative approaches: in this first article I will discuss some fairly obvious improvements in existing slum schools; in a second I will suggest how such slum schools might be supplemented or replaced with radically different ones.

How big is the problem? In recent years an average of 1.5 million people a year have been leaving the farm. Some of them, of course, are the children of commercial farmers, and head for the cities with a good deal of formal education and with the predominately small business mentality of their parents. But the majority of the emigrants from the farm come from subsistence farms, and theirs is the outlook of the peasant rather than the entrepreneur. They are usually jacks of all trades (a little carpentry, a little plumbing, a little auto mechanics), but have neither the formal education nor the cultural agility needed to fit into the highly specialized urban job market. When they arrive in the city they join others equally unprepared for urban life in the slums – a milieu which is in many ways utterly dissociated from the rest of America. Often this milieu is self-perpetuating. I have been unable to find any statistics on how many of these migrants' children and grandchildren have become middle-class, but it is probably not too inaccurate to estimate that about 30 million people live in urban slums, and that about half are second generation residents.

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The incoming DP's from the farm are rarely realistic about what they want from the city. They hope, of course, to make more money – to afford meat for dinner or a beer while watching TV, to pay for a roof that doesn't leak and medicine when they are sick. But while they want to consume the goods in the newspaper and TV advertisements, they are less ready to adopt the job-oriented "all American" style which makes this standard of living possible – both for individuals and for the nation. They rarely come to the city with any religious or ideological commitment to the middle-class virtues. Even (perhaps especially) in the Bible Belt, the rural poor are seldom Calvinist apostles of work, saving, self-help and self-discipline.

Neither before nor after their coming to the city is the world of the poor one in which foresight and the long view pay off. It leads to little but despair. In the city they live often from one spouse to another and always from one eviction notice and repossession order to another; from day to day and hand to mouth, at temporary jobs on hourly pay, in basements washing dishes and in backrooms sorting laundry. Perhaps because they dislike the thought that these jobs will be permanent, they create no unions to protect themselves. As a result their working conditions remain appalling, their job security slight, and their pay scale desperate.

Conversely, these immigrants to the city feel no obligation to their employers. Some habitually miss work after a bad night on the town. Others ignore those parts of their job which they find confusing, tiring or pointless. So employers decide that it would be cheaper and less worrisome to have a machine doing the job. The machine cannot be sullen and cantankerous. It cannot sabotage its employer by doing shoddy work when he is rude. It has no personal problems and few neurotic tendencies. Its back is stronger and its patience longer than that of even the most docile illiterate. So the poor grow poorer, more resentful, and still more unemployable.

Upper-Middle vs Lower-Middle Class Schools

For those educated in the small, provincial and impoverished rural school, where even literacy is an achievement (one American adult in thirteen is believed to be functionally illiterate), the chances of reversing this vicious cycle are small. But need the sins of the fathers be visited on their children? Cannot the slum school do what the rural school cannot: show its pupils how to live within the highly organized corporations and professions which increasingly dominate America?

For better or worse the school is, almost by its very nature, just such an organization. It provides the lower-class child of limited experience with almost his only image of middle-class "work." Unfortunately, it often shows such work at its worst rather than its best. His experience at school, and especially his observation of his teachers, often makes the slum child think that middle-class work is in essence clerical, not professional. The child comes to believe that success in the "respectable" world depends only on doing an infinite succession of meaningless jobs, which he has no part in planning. He assumes, in many cases correctly, that the only difference between school work and adult work is that at the latter one is given adding machines to abet the boredom, and filing cabinets to put the "homework" in. In both cases the reason for doing the job is not the hope of personal satisfaction from its completion but the necessity of earning a wage of grades, credits, and promotions.

When this is the essence of slum education, and of the menial white collar world to which it seems to lead, it is hardly surprising that many slum children rebel. Why should they be on time to work when there is no urgency, or even apparent consequence, in getting the work done? Why should they be orderly when the order has no connection with the pattern of their life? Why should they repress their anger at the person at the next desk when they are tied to him not by a real working relationship or sense of colleagueship but simply by physical proximity? Most of all, why should they make themselves the tools of other people's ambitions. ("I will not be at the beck and call of every man with three cents," William Faulkner is reported to have said on quitting a post office job.)

In theory, of course, the schools can offer more than this. Teachers may be civil servants, but they do not have to appear to their students as clerks whose every action is controlled and checked by the "front office." They could be autonomous professionals who largely controlled their own day to day activities. If they were, the slum child would see that the middle-class world included at least some jobs in which a man (or woman) was largely his own master. And surely if the school presented this face it would make the respectable adult world seem more attractive to many of the talented, ambitious and creative rebels who now see only self-inhibition, goody-goodyism, and the squares.

Let me emphasize here that I am not equating education with adjustment to middle-class life, either of the upper-middle or the lower-middle variety. I doubt that any genuinely educated man can live fully within the limits of the bourgeois world. But the limits of the proletarian world seem to my largely middle-class eye even more narrowly circumscribed, and even less compatible with the good life. So while I would urge every school to encourage rebellion against the prevailing middle-class orthodoxies, I would also urge it to recognize that some forms of rebellion are more creative than others. In particular, it seems to me clear that the

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rebel who begins with some comprehension of middle-class mores is likely to fare better, at least in America, than one who begins without this grasp of his world. Unless the school furnishes its pupils with this grasp, their rebellion is likely to be self-defeating and futile. Instead of creating a new order for themselves or for the world they will fall back into the disorder which lies at both the psychological and sociological heart of slumdom. Instead of becoming revolutionaries they will become delinquents; instead of transcending America they will be defeated by it.

The School vs The Home

If the school is to familiarize its pupils with the main stream of American culture it must provide the slum child with an alternative to the self-defeating style of his family and neighbors. It must be a home away from home. This is no easy task, for the regular school calendar provides that the ghetto shall have exclusive jurisdiction over the child during the first five formative years of life, and that even after that the child shall spend an annual average of only one waking hour out of six in school. Rarely is this enough. Big cities ought to have nursery schools and kindergartens – perhaps compulsory – to give the three, four or five year old some bulwark against his often loveless and mindless home. Perhaps too a six day week, similar to many European schools, and a longer school year would help the child who really wants to get away from the crowded rooms and squabbling relatives which are his home. After-school programs, both of study and of recreation, would also help – especially for those who have nowhere at home to study, even if they want to.

Clearly, however, it takes more than physical facilities to pry the slum child loose from his streetcorner. The teachers must be able to stand *in loco parentis*. They must be warm enough and clever enough (and have time enough) to help the child with the crises that inevitably accompany breaking with home. They must also be strong enough and admirable enough so that the child can, at least in part, try to become like them. The importance of this cannot be overemphasized. Viscerally, though not usually intellectually, the slum child often senses that his family is incapable of coping with the urban bureaucratic world into which it has drifted from the farm. Since these children participate in America's worship of competence, they tend to view their family, and by implication themselves, with contempt. Yet most of these children see no better alternative. Their parents may be afraid of the middle-class world and especially of the school and its authorities, but their teachers (especially the women who are almost universal at the elementary level) are equally afraid of the slums and of lower-class life (especially its sexual side). In such a setting the young are likely to be taken in by the apparent bravado of their slightly older schoolmates, and to adopt the streetcorner gang as their ersatz family circle.

If teachers are to replace parents as mentors of the young slum child, the teachers will have to be better than they now are. The recruitment problem is, however, in large measure a circular one. Unless substantial numbers of lower-class children respond enthusiastically to the slum schools, decide to go on to college, and emerge into the adult world with one foot in the slum and the other in suburbia, an adequate supply of good teachers will be hard to come by. And those who do enter slum teaching will not stay if their school principal treats them as irresponsible clods who must be constantly forced into a prescribed pattern lest they do something stupid. (The principal who thinks this way is, of course, often right. But unless he takes more chances he will never get better staff who more deserve his confidence.)

Beyond this general problem the special difficulties of slum work must be recognized, both by hardship pay and by special training. If this is not done talented teachers will continue to transfer to middle-class parts of town, new jobs in the suburbs, and new careers with better pay. Classes in slum schools must also be reorganized, so that those who are in open rebellion against education are not allowed to obstruct the teacher's efforts to instruct the rest. It is all very well to have heterogeneous classes in a suburban school where the norm is to do assigned work and pass prescribed exams. Then the bright students help educate the dullards and curb the delinquents. But in a slum school the heterogeneous class has exactly the opposite effect: the dullards and delinquents form a majority and help suppress any eccentric who wants to hear what the teacher says or try to master the work she assigns. No child, no matter how ambitious, can learn much in a classroom with 40 pupils when five are seriously disturbed, 25 are indifferent, and the noise level never drops low enough so that you can hear the teacher from the back of the room.

Of course most teachers deny that a student can be properly educated in a class as large as 40, even if it is homogeneous. In the slums, according to an excellent pamphlet ("Education and the Disadvantaged American") recently drafted for the NEA's Educational Policies Commission, 20 is probably the optimal size. Yet research has never provided much empirical support for this claim. At least on exams, children taught in large classes usually do about as well as those taught in small. Before spending the billion-odd dollars it would cost to cut slum classes to 20, it would be worthwhile setting up a number of experimental slum schools, similar to others in all but this respect, and

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seeing if the innovation made any perceptible long-term difference to either teachers or students. (My guess is it would, at least to staff morale.)

Indeed if any single expenditure could make a decisive long-term difference in the education of the lower classes, it would probably be the establishment, either by a foundation or by a federal agency, of perhaps a dozen experimental schools in slum areas. Each could then take an unselected cross section of the local slum population and try out various administrative and pedagogic schemes for improving the over-all educational climate. One could test whether specially trained and carefully selected teachers produce perceptibly different students over the years. Another might demonstrate whether adequate staffs of school psychiatrists and social workers, and programs providing for direct contact between teachers and parents of "difficult" or "unmotivated" children, make a difference. Still another might try to show that making the curriculum either more or less "achievement oriented" has some measurable long-term effect on slum students. The Ford Foundation is now sponsoring a variety of valuable pilot programs along some of these lines, but few of these are research-oriented *i.e.* few use control groups.

In all of the foregoing discussion I have assumed that the school must be an adequate microcosm of the possibilities of American life. In my observation children will rarely work hard in school merely to get rewards after graduation. They succeed only where, at least covertly, they enjoy the ritual of the classroom, the library, the laboratory, and the exam room.

But while the school should be a microcosm of the middle class adult world, it should also systematically introduce its pupils to that world. Unless they acquire some grasp of the corporate and professional organizations in which intelligence and knowledge are valued, students are likely to assume that the school is conning them when it tries to develop these qualities. Many have never heard a concert or seen a play, much less met a man (especially a man of their own ethnic group) who held an important job of which he was proud. This kind of exposure is important – partly to convince the child that school is not a dead-end but mostly to give him a firmer hold on the world to which his text books, his teachers, and even (with conspicuous and intriguing exceptions) his language, refer.

Who Pays the Bill?

The reforms and experiments discussed above – the school calendar, the recruitment and training of teachers, classroom organization and size, broader adult contacts – could easily mean doubling the $300-400 per student which most cities now spend in the slums. Does such an expenditure make economic sense? Will it increase the productivity of the schools' graduates sufficiently to justify itself? Or decrease the vast sums now spent for public welfare?

Nobody can be sure. But this uncertainity is not the principle obstacle to making the experiment. Even if we had thoroughly documented studies showing that investment in slum schools paid off, the capital would probably be very hard to raise. For the slums are an underdeveloped country. They have little capital, and less sense of how to invest it productively. The poor make no strong political demand for better schools.

In principle, perhaps, the middle classes ought to be interested in slum schools, on the ground that better education would provide a bigger tax base and less public welfare taxation. But few taxpayers see that far ahead. Even if they did, they would see that the child who goes to a slum school and becomes a junior executive will move as quickly as possible to suburbia, and pay his taxes there. He will be replaced by a new relief applicant from Georgia or the Okarks. So long as there is a backlog of rural poverty to be liquidated, money spent on trying to eliminate the slums will seem like money down the drain from the viewpoint of local businessmen who control local school budgets.

The same logic applies to manpower problems. So long as schools are locally controlled, a kind of Gresham's law of education seem to operate, in which every taxpaying business tries to keep the cost of local education down while bidding up the price of highly trained workers educated elsewhere. If education were nationally controlled this might change. Businessmen might find it attractive to pay more taxes for education and create skilled manpower surpluses which would keep their labor costs down. But that is not just around the corner.

So long as the origins of the slums lie in the countryside, while the symptoms lie in the cities, local action is unlikely to meet the problem. To date the states have been singularly indifferent to the problems of the really poor, either rural or urban. The federal government has been mainly interested in the popular short-term palliatives like public housing and unemployment insurance, not long-term ventures like education.

The main obstacle to Federal action is the conviction that it is politically impossible to concentrate aid in the slums at the expense of suburbs, small towns and everybody else. (General aid to all schools on the $10-$20 per pupil now contemplated would hardly make a dent in the slum school's problems.) Then too, Congress is understandably reluctant to go on record either for or against aid to parochial schools. This may make the situation hopeless. But in a second article I will outline some rather unorthodox programs which might simultaneously allow Congressmen to help the slum child and avoid cutting their political throats.

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A Yankee Looks at the Races

by Donald C. Simmons

Subtitled "A Yankee View," prefaced with a foreword by a Charleston editor who heralds it as "... a signal contribution to an understanding of the race controversy ..." and with an introduction signed by four scientists, the most eminent being the geneticist Dr. R. Ruggles Gates, *Race and Reason* has been promoted by a full-page advertisement in the book section of *The New York Times* and, since I myself have recently received two form letters from the National Putnam Letters Committee about the book, notice of it is presumably being circulated among the membership list of the American Anthropological Association (in an endeavor to locate an apostate anthropologist?). Further, since the copy in the Public Library of West Hartford, Connecticut, has been donated by the North-South Council, the book is evidently being widely disseminated by its supporters, thus making it more than merely a leaf of Southern magnolia. It represents the most recent and widespread Southern intellectual effort to combat the horrid, un-American assumptions underlying the 1954 Supreme Court desegregation decision. The reviewer of the book in the *American Bar Association Journal*, commends it to the Bar "... to assist it ... to learn not half truths, propagandized history nor pseudo science, but 'the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth'." We shall see.

Race and Reason
A Yankee View
by Carleton Putnam
(Public Affairs; paper – $2,
hardcover – $3.50)

Carleton Putnam tells us of his ancestry, his liking for the West (especially the Bad Lands of South Dakota) not only for their scenery but because they are "... important as symbols ... figures of pride and self-reliance, and primordially American," his schooling (he graduated from Princeton and from Columbia Law School, this latter helping him to realize "... the importance of our Anglo-American heritage, particularly in the field of moral values and basic principles"), his services as President of Chicago and Southern Airlines and later as Chairman of the board of Delta Air Lines, and his retirement to write a biography of Theodore Roosevelt.

He goes on to give the genesis of the book. First aroused by a *Life* editorial of September 22, 1958, he wrote a letter published in *The Memphis Commercial Appeal* and then widely reprinted in the South. Later, he wrote a letter to President Eisenhower in which, *inter alia*, he protested against the arrogance of the Supreme Court's performance ("Neither the North, nor the court, has any holy mandate inherent in the trend of the times or the progress of liberalism to reform society in the South"), the court's violation of the white man's right to freedom of association by enforcing the black man's right to equal education, and the attempt to bestow a social status without it first being earned.

A fund was formed to circulate Mr. Putnam's letter in the North; it was published in *The New York Times* on January 5, 1959 along with a coupon soliciting money: "Each advertisement ... brought in enough money *from the North* to pay for the next," thus enabling it to appear in 18 large Northern and Western papers. Its appearance brought him many replies, only five percent being hostile, and an analysis of these startled Putnam since their main misunderstanding lay in "modern" anthropology, thus compelling him to realize how cleverly the "broad movement to change man's concept of the nature of man" by widening equality and opportunity "into a doctrine of social, cultural, economic and genetic equality," had infiltrated into the sciences surrounding anthropology.

Putnam sent his hostile correspondents copies of his March 16, 1959 letter to Attorney General Rogers, written after he had studied law briefs and started "... reading again in the Boas school of anthropology." However, he began his anthropological "studies" before learning the "facts" about Boas, which he gleefully gives us on page 18: "... his minority group background ... the names of his students ..." plus additional old gossip about Columbia University's Department of Anthropology. From Putnam's remarks I infer that the reader is supposed to conclude that "Boasian" anthropology is unworthy of serious credence since Boas and some of his students originally were Jews, while at least one of his students was also a Communist sympathizer. Putnam's and his wife's readings of this "clever and insidious propaganda posing in the name of science" eventually made them laugh out loud at the hoax which had taken in a whole generation of Americans.

Putnam next began getting in touch with scientists (some of whom must be exceptionally interesting specimens: one asked Putnam if he had been followed; another disclosed that "... he had evidence he was being checked by mulattoes at his lectures"), who proved withdrawn, and hesitant to express their true convictions because they feared reprisal. (Putnam will disclose their names if any public official will guarantee their livelihood.)

From the third chapter, Putnam's ideas can be summarized thus:

(1) Negroes, who are better off in USA than anywhere else, possess frontal brain lobes inferior to those of Caucasoids and definitely want intermarriage, which would only lower the present superiority of the

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whites; Negroes of ability possess white genes.

(2) Equalitarian ideology, which plays into Communist hands, stems from the attempts of immigrants from Southern and Eastern Europe to prove that they are just as good as older American stocks; hence the objectivity of Jewish anthropologists must be questioned since they have self-serving missions to fulfill.

(3) Southerners, who are less prejudiced towards the Negro than Northerners and who have never adulterated the Protestant Ethic like the "new immigrants" of the North, should work to enlighten the North, and protect the Negro from himself.

Putnam then presents a hortatory five-page conclusion explaining why the "equalitarian virus" has slowly eroded the minds of "otherwise sensible men." He cautions that exclusive emphasis should not be placed on genetics, which only defines limits; environmental conditions should also be improved, although in the process minority groups should never be allowed to dilute true American values. Two kinds of mulatto are distinguished: "good" and "bad"; the "good" try to redeem a past that is beyond their control, while the "bad," "... bent on making the nation mulatto," are a danger since they have a grudge against society and regard "... every Southerner who sensed the genetic truth as a bigot and use ... every tactic of deceit and every balance-of-power position to teach and vote a genetic fallacy." Finally, since the Negro does not want to return to Africa but prefers to share in the benefits of American life, then "... let him not undertake to destroy their source, nor to be made a tool by white men of alien background and design."

To delineate and rectify Putnam's many errors and half-truths would be a task equivalent to cleansing the Augean stables. Instead, I confine my comments to Putnam's way of reasoning – a form of anti-logic in which white's white, black's black and the only greys are presumably "bad" mulattoes.

His *ad hominem* arguments consist in precluding inquiry into scientific conclusions by rationalizing the reason scientists hold them – thus minority group members have an axe to grind, while non-minority group members, such as myself, whose American ancestry is as ancient as Putnam's but who believe that the evidence amply warrants the conclusions of modern anthropology, are explicable as either being Communists or the unconscious victims of hypnosis.

Putnam's a-historical approach consists in concentrating only on what is commendable in Caucasoid history and on what is disreputable in Negro history. Atrocious brutality forms a part of every group's social past and deliberate search for it will always be rewarded. Is it not an instructive comment on old Norse society, whose modern descendants are models of propriety, that a man should receive in a saga the nickname "children's man" because of his refusal to impale children on his spear?

Putnam selectively documents rather than investigates his hypothesis: if he finds a statement in an anthropology book which tends to support his contention, he rips it out of context and uses it; if it negates his hypothesis, it is ignored or its author impugned.

When Putnam remarks that Southerners like Negroes better than Northerners do, aside from noting that Negroes *are* Southerners and Northerners too, I cannot help recalling Professor Charles Fairman's remarks in his *American Constitutional Decisions* on Justice McReynolds, who always saw to it that Negro servants of the Supreme Court had tickets to every circus that came to Washington, but who was the least willing member of the Supreme Court to investigate a charge that a trial had been vitiated by racial prejudice. White Southerners like Negroes as long as they play the role of Uncle Tom and unquestioningly accept their second-, third-, or even, depending on the locality, fourth-class citizenship. I read some of Putnam's statements to one of my former anthropology students, who remarked (and I have slightly revised his statement since college youth is irreverently inclined to go straight to the heart of the matter), "That is horse manure!" The name of this victim of hypnosis will be supplied on request, provided Putnam or some public official will guarantee his future livelihood.

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

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The Scientist as a Political Animal

by William E. Boggs

In the past two decades, American scientists have found themselves called from the discipline and isolation of their laboratories to conference rooms where national policy is formed. According to the author, a young professor at Princeton, "Neither in any nation of the world with the possible exception of contemporary Russia, nor in any other historical period, have scientists had an influence in political life comparable to that currently exercised by American scientists." This is particularly true with regard to nuclear weapons, where the "indecisiveness and technical unawareness" of American political leaders have permitted – or forced – scientists to conceive almost all of the major innovations in US policy: the Baruch Plan, the hydrogen bomb, the development of tactical nuclear weapons, the ballistic missile and a ban on nuclear tests.

American Scientists and Nuclear Weapons Policy
by Robert Gilpin
(Princeton; $6.95)

Gilpin treats each of these subjects in some detail, but his chief emphasis is on the role of scientists in the controversy about a nuclear test ban. He classifies politically active scientists into three groups: The Control School, the Limited Containment School, and the Infinite Containment School.

The Control School, whose spokesmen include the chemist Linus Pauling of the California Institute of Technology and the physicist Philip Morrison of Cornell, consists of scientists who want to eliminate nuclear weapons by some form of international agreement. The Finite Containment School, represented by the physicists J. Robert Oppenheimer of the Institute for Advanced Study and Hans Bethe of Cornell, holds that the US should limit the nuclear arms race "at some finite point prior to the settlement of political differences" with the USSR, but must also "contain Soviet aggression." The Infinite Containment School, whose loudest protagonist is the "Father of the H-bomb," Edward Teller of the Lawrence Radiation Laboratory, favors the rapid development and production of more efficient nuclear weapons. Up to quite recently, theirs has been the paramount influence; so far, they have prevented a ban on nuclear tests by arguing that because a control system cannot detect *all* nuclear tests, the USSR will probably cheat in secret. They insist that the arms race must continue indefinitely – that is, until the USSR becomes an open society.

Mr. Gilpin does not accuse the scientists of distorting facts to fit their particular political viewpoints. "On the contrary," he states, "one discovers that the American scientist's professional commitment to the truth has universally overcome his personal disappointment with the nature of the truth." Yet Gilpin emphasizes repeatedly that the advice of scientists is seldom if ever solely technical, and are based on political and ethical judgments, such as whether or not the Soviets are determined to cheat, and whether or not the political desirability of a test ban outweighs the military risk.

He explores the difference between scientists' and politicians' way of thinking with great insight: "To scientists, political reality does not always constitute a 'given' which must be taken into account; instead, it is often assumed to be a malleable superficiality which man's reason can change. . . ." As Jerome Wiesner, President Kennedy's science advisor, put it, "The scientist is impatient in finding a solution." In the author's words, "he is unsatisfied with the tiny steps that comprise most political action, and is often repelled by the requirements for success in politics." Thus, "whereas the politician often seeks to persuade an opponent through appeals to passion, the threat of force, and the use of force, the scientist tends to assume there is one truth to which all reasonable men will accede once its nature has been explained."

The author has tried to present fairly


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

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the viewpoint of each "school" of scientists and in large measure he has succeeded, though he does seem rather gullible about some of the oft-repeated propaganda of the Infinite Containment School. Few seismologists and now perhaps not even the White House experts would agree with his statement that "there was and is no positive way to identify an underground nuclear explosion merely through a study of the properties of the seismic signal." Professor Gilpin accepts without question the dubious 1959 US estimates that downgraded the effectiveness of the Geneva control system, estimates which the US government itself now concedes were erroneous. He begins a discussion of the current US nuclear tests with the phrase, "Confronted with the danger of new Soviet tests which might shift the balance of power, and with the need of the US to test new weapons designs . . ." a piece of Dr. Teller's special pleading that is inacceptable as a flat statement of fact. Again, he states that the Soviets "have yet to agree to the establishment of one control post on their territory," although the USSR proposed in 1960 to permit 15 control posts within its borders. But these and a few other similar statements are the exception rather than the rule. After a careful and detached analysis the author concludes that the US and the USSR are about equally to blame for the failure to agree on a treaty to ban nuclear tests.

Art and the Anthropoids

by Frank Getlein

About eight years ago mild interest was aroused by silly-season press association dispatches from Baltimore about a painting chimpanzee named Betsy, a resident of the city zoo who turned out abstract expressionist works quite comparable, in photographs, to works being produced by higher primates on Tenth Street, NYC and in East Hampton, LI. Wiseacres in city rooms around the country read the stuff off the B wire as one more proof that abstract expressionism was monkey business, but the truly cynical immediately assumed the whole thing was a fraud contrived for one or more of three reasons by one or more of three likely candidates: by Congressman Dondero to prove that modern artists were not only Communists but also apes; by reporters to liven up a dull week; or by some astute art dealer to add further distinction to his stable.

As happens so regularly and so gratifyingly, cynicism turned out to be naïveté in thin disguise. There was no fraud. Betsy and the paintings were on the level. The performances were witnessed by thousands on television. Respectable zoo-keepers were involved. Presently it became known that the London Zoo was doing the same kind of work in experimental aesthetics. Their candidate, Congo, drew a television audience of three million. Sir Julian Huxley opened a Congo show in London from which many of his (Congo's) paintings were sold for stiff prices. Later a two-chimp show was arranged in England and the United States and the ties between the two great Atlantic powers became even closer.

The Biology of Art
by Desmond Morris
(Knopf; $6.50)

The Biology of Art is a well-illustrated, straightforward "study of the picture-making behavior of the great apes and its relationship to human art" by the Berenson of ape art, Desmond Morris, Curator of Mammals at the London Zoological Society. Clearly one of the young men at the Zoo, Mr. Morris headed the film unit for which Congo did most of his painting.

At times Mr. Morris strikes a note similar to Berenson's regrets at having hung around with Duveen for so long. An Oxford student of fish behavior, Mr. Morris transferred to London because of the rare opportunity the film job offered to have control of enough apes to make a decent study of apes and art. He was barely settled in his post when word came across the sea of

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Baltimore Betsy and her popular triumphs. British pressure, popular and official, diluted his dedicated scholarship with television spectacle. The first and perhaps worst change was the substitution of more dramatic paints for more meaningful pencils. Mr. Morris succeeded in holding out against finger painting, the favorite medium of Betsy, but he presently found himself issuing international challenges on behalf of Congo, assenting to comparative exhibitions of ape-stract and abstract expressionism, and watching his primary material, Congo's paintings, vanish into the gaping maws of the art trade.

He cites one experience with a chimp artist that applies to the London program as a whole and perhaps to some aspects of abstract expressionism as a social phenomenon: the ape "was once subjected to bribery with a food reward to encourage it to draw more intensely. . . . The ape quickly learnt to associate drawing with getting the reward but as soon as this condition had been established the animal took less and less interest in the lines it was drawing. Any old scribble would do and then it would immediately hold out its hand for the reward. The careful attention the animal had paid previously to design, rhythm, balance and composition was gone and the worst kind of commercial art was born!"

If there is indeed a relationship between the art of apes and that of the American fifties, this point is one of the most important connections. The trick, for Mr. Morris, was to keep the pictures for the artists a "self-rewarding activation." In great measure, Mr. Morris succeeded. In New York, on the contrary, no one ever made the attempt. Hence, for most of the decade, "any old scribble would do."

The question remains as to just how comparable the two forms of art activity are. It seems relevant to point out that while photographically there is great similarity, most of the ape art is relatively quite small, most of the abtract expressionist art relatively enormous. Mr. Morris speaks at the end of a bright future in his field. It may be that he, or other experimenters will make the obvious next step of giving the apes large canvases and long brushes to see if they can make the step from photograph to reality. In the meantime, it is worth recalling the acceptance of photographic similarity as actual similarity by the abstract expressionist spokesmen themselves in the case of Monet. Blow-ups of small corners of Monet flower pictures demonstrated clearly that he was an abtract expressionist decades before his time. Tentatively, and awaiting further word from Mr. Morris, we can probably say that insofar as Monet was really an abstract expressionist, just so far were the abstract expressionists really apes.

Mr. Morris himself provides a model of artistic analysis that one could wish would be followed by analysts of similar art produced by humans. A great deal has been made of the relationship of science and the art of the fifties, but we can now see the wrong sciences were thought of. Science, in contemporary art analysis, almost always meant either nuclear physics or deep-field astronomy. Descriptive zoology would be much more to the point. As a descriptive zoologist, for example, Mr. Morris has no difficulty in simply describing the colors and patterns that Congo put down on paper, a task utterly beyond the nuclear physicists and astronomers who were writing art criticism in America in the fifties. Again, in analyzing Congo's "fan pattern," Mr. Morris very provocatively relates it to a similar action-pattern of nest-making observable among chimpanzees. For all their photographic studies of various human artists at work, the art scientists never came up with such a stimulating and attractive explanation of an observed artistic phenomenon.

Mr. Morris follows the art activities of his apes right up to the threshold of the earliest human art of representation, the circle, which, in the work of a child, immediately precedes first efforts to draw a human head. There the work

NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

Donald C. Simmons *is on the faculty of Sociology and Anthropology at the University of Connecticut.* William E. Boggs *is a science editor for a New York publishing house.*

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breaks off and Congo, like most ape artists, goes off into adult life as a male mate. This conclusion, too, if the fundamental similarity between the two kinds of art is accepted, has optimistic implications for the future of abstract expressionist art. Although Mr. Morris does not draw such a conclusion, his final chapters seem to point to some kind of inevitable adulthood for such painters: either they give up painting, like Congo, for other activities, or they pass the threshold, like human children, and begin to make of art something more than playing with paint.

MOVIES

A Lady and Some Gentlemen

An advertisement for a correspondence school of authorship begins: "How Do You *Know* You Can't Write?" Well, for that matter, How Do You *Know* You Can't Be A New-Wave Director? Have you tried? Follow these simple steps and be the first in your gang to make an art movie.

Cleo from 5 to 7
(Zenith)
The Best of Enemies
(Columbia)

1. Get a good cameraman. The worst of these films is interestingly, if not beautifully, photographed.

2. Get a story. This is less important. Your story need not be gripping or valid.

3. Cast the female lead with a photogenic girl, not necessarily an actress. Be guided by the soulful expressions of high-fashion models.

4. Lay it on. "It" is the New Wave repertoire of stunts, camera techniques, and cutting. Examples: Use freakish faces for minor characters (this is candor). Use a little nudeness (this is maturity). Include long walks through a city, preferably Paris; just long, pointless walks – to show that you are as free of plot contrivances as Antonioni. Dwell on such *bizarrerie* as street performers who swallow and regurgitate live frogs or who push hat-pins through their biceps (this shows how ugly life is and how you are facing it). Let your microphone record snatches of irrelevant conversations at neighboring café tables (this wraps your story in a naturalistic web). Retain the footage where passers-by stare into the camera (thus you prove that you "stole" your film from the street and that you wear your *rue* with a difference). Do not omit Resnais backward jumps (cutting back to a moment just passed), as this expresses a mystique about time. Have your heroine sing a torch song, Judy Garlanded with *Angst*. And if you can work in some silent-film burlesque, à la Malle, you will demonstrate both your superiority to and your respect for early movies.

All these devices, and more, occur in a French picture called *Cleo from 5 to 7*, written and directed by Agnes Varda. The film is worth comment because Miss Varda, who is in her mid-thirties, is one of the few female directors anywhere and because she is said to be one of the ideologists of her school. (A French Film Office booklet says that she "*représente le 'sexe faible' au sein des réalisateurs de la Nouvelle Vague.*") She has made a number of documentaries; this is her first full-length work.

It does not deal, as you may think, with France's much-vaunted marital *cinq à sept*. Miss Varda tells the story of a Parisian *chanteuse*, Cleo, in the two hours before she is to hear the results of a biopsy. It opens with a portentous tarot-card sequence under the titles, in color; the rest of the picture is back-and-white. The two hours are marked by the director's notes at the bottom of the screen ("Cleo 5:03-5:07"; "Cleo 5:07-5:11," etc.), so we expect a minute-for-minute two-hour film. However it runs only 86 minutes. We see a cross-section of a woman's life: her rich lover, her career, her loneliness in the midst of teeming activity, and how this crisis brings her a chance for Real

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Affection. Towards the end she meets a soldier in the park and their compressed, months-in-a-minute romance burns with a hard, M-G-M-like flame. He accompanies her to the hospital where she gets good news.

The pat shape of the story, its very cleverness, the shallowness of its emotional exploration, the heroine's self-conscious dramatization, make it merely a flashily dressed-up conventional tear-jerker, a sob sister of the works of Fannie Hurst. The avant-garde trappings disguise nothing; it is Irving Berlin orchestrated by Stravinsky.

Cleo is impersonated by Corinne Marchand, a voluptuous pop singer, who responds like a silky circus horse to Miss Varda's *Weltschmerz* whip. Her behavior and the entire film seem almost a parody of the best things done by Truffaut, Godard, Resnais, Chabrol – a sedulous exercise in what can be called Cleo-realism.

Perhaps Miss Varda has been badly served by the timing of her first appearance in this country. Although her work now seems thoroughly imitative, she may have been something of a stylistic innovator. But what is irrefutable is her weak instinct for truth, her defective judgment of this posturing, novelettist tale as a work of resonance, worthy of or redeemable by all the apparatus of current French cinema modes. *Tristesse* has been heavily imposed on triteness.

The Best of Enemies, a comedy about the British-Italian battles in North Africa is peopled with theatrical stereotypes: pip-pip Englishmen and ingratiatingly pragmatic Italians. To protect everyone's feelings, the film was made by an Italian producer, an English director, a mixed team of writers, and, of course, a mixed cast – headed by David Niven and Alberto Sordi. One senses that a careful ledger has been kept on the digs and dignities for each side. There are some amusing moments, but generally they are only the basic ones – that is, the laughs that any clod who made this film would find inevitable. The lack of freshness or sharpness of characterization, the momentum of the see-saw that raises and lowers the opponents in turn, render the picture a somewhat plodding, mild affair.

The common humanity of all soldiers

buy him his life

Tran Dien, Vietnamese, age 5. Father ill. Cannot work. Mother tea-picker. Losing sight. Unable to choose good leaves from bad. Lost job. Five children in family "Home" is thatch hut. Earthen floors. Dien has almost no clothes. No trousers. Shown in photo with borrowed pants for sake of dignity. No decent food. Nothing. Poverty extreme. Parents despairing for children. Help to Dien means help to entire family. Need acute.

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can be stated in satire as well as serious drama. But there is no room in such satire for cheap warm-heartedness, for pretence that nobody really got hurt in World War II, that it didn't make any difference which side won, that it was all just a temporary misunderstanding among some jolly fellows.

STANLEY KAUFFMANN

Correspondence

Around the Middle East

Sirs:

Your article "Around the Middle East," (August 13), came as a surprise to us. In spite of Nasser's past, he seems to have captivated your imagination "as the most 'progressive' force in the area." As we understand progress, it means (1) promoting peace with one's neighbors, (2) promoting domestic reforms, and (3) keeping Soviet influence and arms out of the area. By this definition, Nasser has done more to set back progress than any other leader in the Middle East. Cairo Radio has been a very unsettling influence attempting to undermine the stability of Sudan, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and of course Israel. Nasser has illegally used the Suez Canal for his own political ends, not only against Israel, but against Western countries as well. If there is any single person who is most responsible for maintaining Arab belligerence against Israel, it is Nasser. He shamelessly uses the Arab refugees as a political club, instead of attempting to rehabilitate them, thus keeping the possibility of peace between Egypt and Israel out of the question. What is even worse, is that he intimidates every other Arab leader from coming to terms with Israel by demagogic use of the Cairo radio.

As for his recent social reforms, we would have been more impressed if it had not taken ten years for him to bring them into existence. Because of Egypt's overabundance of human resources and lack of natural resources (you seem to be the only one who has found any!), the prognosis for the future remains dim, even assuming the Aswan Dam project is completed. Not only has Nasser achieved little within his own country, but by keeping the area in turmoil, he makes it difficult for other governments to make progress with their own domestic problems.

The real progressive force in the area is clearly Israel. As you say "her security requirements conflict with her need to convince the Arabs of her peaceful intentions." Yet, somehow this becomes "Israeli militancy" in your rather confused article.

Arthur J. Greenfield
Nathan Wiser
University of Chicago

Up From Slavery

Sirs:

Gerald W. Johnson attempts to do three things in "A Sidelong Glance" (August 13): cite a valid criticism of



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Myrdal's *An American Dilemma* by making a mere allegation; define "Americanism" in Tarheel terms, or, equate this fuzzy shibboleth with something like "gradualism," or "moderation"; and declare a psychological dividend from this platform by pointing up the contrast between the conditions of life, property and dignity among suffering people of color in Mississippi and those in South Africa.

Now the essence of what Myrdal said at Howard University was that the American political revolution (meaning the Civil War) was not backed up by social and economic reform; that the Negro people were left to the mercy – such as it was – of the White upper caste of the South; and that there are two sides of Americanism to ponder under present-day conditions: the material side as indicated in the growing affluence of Americans as economic men, and the spiritual side as represented in the "reality of the ideals enshrined in your constitution and rooted in the hearts of the American people."

Here was a mind grounded in a moral sense of history too thoroughly integrated to get lost in lachrymose and lyrical howling up one of the hollow trees in the petrified sector of its forest (*cf.* Gerald W. Johnson, "To Live and Die in Dixie," *The Atlantic*, July 1960.) And Myrdal's is such a sane outlook as often pervaded that of a Johnson still worth reading and quoting. "He thinks justly," wrote the Johnson (who wrote words of wisdom rather than with a wisdom with words) we can believe, of Addison, "but he thinks faintly." And perhaps more to the point: "It ought to be the first endeavor of a writer to distinguish between nature and custom; or that which is established because it is right, from that which is right only because it is established." The difference between the two-volume study by Myrdal and the twenty listed under the name of Gerald W. Johnson is quality and integrated perspective.

Henry F. Winslow, Sr.
Morgan State College
Baltimore, Md.

"ALL IT TAKES nowadays is one wrong word, Paine. One alarmist in a sensitive spot – like that damned superpatriot Revere." – "'Patience'," said Paine. "'These are the times that try men's patience.'" – "Excellent," said the Adjutant. "Patience is exactly what's needed in this complex world. There aren't any simple solutions anymore, Paine. No 100% American answers. When are you going to grow up – this is the eighteenth century, man!"

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Hell Bent for Armageddon

Sirs:

Having just read Michael Brower's marvelous *reductio ad absurdum* ("Controlled Nuclear War," July 30) of the Counter Force controversy, I came up for air wondering how long this disgusting nuclear farce will continue in Washington, Geneva, Moscow, Paris, and way stations.

We are hell bent for Armageddon and obliteration and nobody seems to care, least of all our Pentagon leaders to whom we have mistakenly entrusted our defences and our lives.

Emile Holman, MD
Stanford University
School of Medicine

Heroes of Japanese Youth

Sirs:

I have read with a great sympathy R. J. Lifton's "Heroes of Japanese Youth" (August 13). He describes accurately the fads of the young Japanese. I would like to add some typical "drynesses" popular among those who were born after the outbreak of World War II. They have ceased to call Tenno as His Imperial Majesty, but simply call him by the pet name of Otenchan, which blasphemy might have been considered lese majesty in pre-war days. They have little interest in classical Japonica, but they cling to TV's Westerns and Rock-and-Roll.

I am in favor of the straightforward ways of the young Japanese. As Mr. Lifton has adroitly pointed out, they will find their own way between the old moisture and the new heat. The only thing we must be cautious about, is an innocence of wars found among Japanese boys, which make them feel a thrill when they watch a documentary movie about the genocide of Auschwitz.

Akira Watanabe
University of Arizona

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

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

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

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

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

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